The Problems with Blaming by Blumoff, Theodore Y.
#
 Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, Macon, Georgia.  Portions of this paper were
delivered at a colloquium at Georgia State University College of Law, at a Faculty Workshop at Washington
University’s School of Law, at john Marshall Law School, and at a Mercer University Law School Faculty
Development Colloquium.  I will present the main thesis of this work at a conference on “Law, Mind and Brain,” at
University College London and the Gruter Institute on February 13-14, 2006.  Many thanks to those colleagues and
friends who offered friendly and helpful comments and suggestions on this and related projects, including Robert
Audi, Karen Kovach, Harold Lewis, Stephen Morse, and Jack Sammons.  As always, I appreciate the financial and
collegial support of Mercer Law School.  Finally, special thanks to Rebecca McKelvey (Class of 2006) for timely
and thorough research assistance.
**
 Thomas Nagel, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 120 (Oxford 1986).
*** See Hastings Rashdall, Punishment and the Individual, in G. Ezorsky, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON PUNISHMENT 6, 7 (New York: State University of N. Y. Press, 1972). 
1
 On the naturalist features of blaming, see Adam Smith, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Prometheus
Books 2000); Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, PROC. BRIT. ACADEMY (1962), reprinted in FREE WILL 59
(ed. by Gary Watson; Oxford 1982). 
THE PROBLEMS WITH BLAMING
By Theodore Y. Blumoff#
“To . . .  blame is not to judge merely that what happened was a . . . bad thing, but
to judge the person for having done it, in view of the circumstances under which
it was done.  The difficulty is to explain how this is possible.”**
[H]ow the reformatory view of punishment can be accused of disrespect for
human personality, because . . .  it uses a man’s animal organism or his lower
psychical nature as a means to the good of his higher self, I cannot profess to
understand.***
Introduction: On Blaming
We devote substantial time and energy to blaming wrongdoers, and too often (in the
process) we brush aside our basic commitments to the decency of compassion that produces
the goal of rehabilitation.  Although we cannot escape the practice of blaming because there
is something in our nature that requires the practice,1 we must be able to harness it.  I, like
Hastings Rashdall who is quoted above, don’t profess to understand those who oppose
reformatory punishment because it interferes with the goal of retribution.  Protecting our
children, in my view, transcends retribution qua retribution.  I will advance a more
pragmatic stance when it comes to protecting future generations, one which hopes to bring
moral educational tools to those adjudicated wrongdoers who are capable of being helped.
I should be clear that I do not suggest that we eliminate blaming as a social practice.
To the contrary:  It endures as a feature capable of pervading our decision-making and so
our culture because it permits us to tell wrongdoers, as directly as the context allows, that
2
 I don’t mean to suggest that inadvertently caused harms are entirely non-blameworthy, see Judith Andre,
Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, 43 ANALYSIS 202 (1983), only that they typically occasion less blame than do
intentionally caused harms..
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 In the child-rearing context, blame serves as a tool for teaching moral responsibility, including genuine
feelings of shame and guilt and resentment and the like, on the one hand, and love and respect and compassion, on
the other.   Following Hume, therefore, I incline toward a utilitarian (even pragmatic) view of blame and punishment. 
See David Hume, Of the Immortality of the Soul, in SELECTED CLASSICS 324, 327-28 (Stephen Copley and Andrew
Edgar eds. Oxford 1996).  See generally Paul Russell, Hume on Responsibility and Punishment, 20 CAN. J. PHIL.
539, 550-52 (1990). 
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 This course follows multiple tracks, and not least ones that describe form and another substance.  There
are, as Bernard Williams notes, many modalities for blaming.  Some take the proleptic form, “If I were you I would
have (or not have) Med.”  This form of advising involves “treating the person who is blamed like someone who had
a reason to do the right thing but did not do it.”  Bernard Williams, Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blaming,
in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 35, 42-3 (Cambridge 1995).   On the substance
side, the least that we can and should expect is a sufficient understanding, one that takes into account Hillel’s
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they have committed wrongs that we disapprove of, that they should have done something
else on the occasion we judge wrongful, and that they should not commit similar acts in the
future (or else face substantial pain, if they are not facing it already).  The need to cast
blame is both a natural defensive stance and, I think, an essential one, at least for the
foreseeable future.  To the question, then, “Is blaming per se inappropriate,” where blaming
instantiates an ascription of fault or demerit to an individual for producing an unwelcome
outcome intentionally (at least usually),2 the answer is:  “Of course not.  It can’t be.” 
It can’t be, because if blaming served no other purpose, it would remain a valued tool
in our efforts to advance our children’s ethical and moral conditioning.  As a child-rearing
practice exercised with love and compassion, and employed with a long term view of moral
development, blaming often helps us achieve the important goal of educating our children
in shared moral, social, cultural and legal norms, thereby furthering the project of civilizing
them in light of our status as the ultimate primate.3 Anyway you look at it, we are members
of a species of the primate genus that needs civilizing care.
As good parents, we have generally devised and followed the basic formal outlines
for the moral education of any child, and not only our own.  It begins with a certain kind of
discipline that requires, as a necessary condition to success, the neurobiological capacity
to internalize the basic moral demands of our society, and thereafter some x+ number of
opportunities to learn the basics, where x+ often represents a number of examples over a
period of time that falls well outside our initial uneducated hopes and expectations, at least
for some of our children some of the time.  To meet our own needs and those of our
children, we employ educational strategies that require perseverant efforts over long
periods of time directed at teaching the everyday material of values.  Reaching that goal, in
turn, dictates the need to make available to every child variably graded exercises pointed
at learning the nature of individual agency and its obligations:  at instilling the notion that
each of us can (prima facie) recognize ourselves as sources of effect on the world, and so at
inculcating practices that appropriately praise good and censure bad.4 An adequate moral
description of TORAH:  “What is hateful unto you, do not unto your neighbor.  The rest is commentary–now go and
study.” See, e.g., Karen Armstrong, A HISTORY OF GOD: THE 4000-YEAR QUEST OF JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND
ISLAM 72 (Alfred A. Knopf 1993); Joseph Telushkin, JEWISH LITERACY: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO KNOW
ABOUT THE JEWISH RELIGION, ITS PEOPLE, AND ITS HISTORY, 62-63 (William Morrow & Co. 1991).  On the
possibility of viewing oneself from something other than the first person singular standpoint, see Gerald J. Postema,
Morality in the First Person Plural, 14 LAW AND PHILOS. 35 (1995).
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 JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY  208-10 (Cambridge 1998). See SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAMING: VICTIMS,
PERPETRATORS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 133-39 (Harvard 1996).  Bernard Williams describes this process as one that
culminates in the implicit understanding that an agent knows what it means to act “on reasons,” a stance that requires
a sense of reciprocity which adjudicated wrongdoers, in light of their misconduct, are often unable to manage. 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 65 (Boston: Harvard U. Press 1985).   When it comes
to blaming children, the point of blaming is the hope of creating self-correcting proleptic mechanisms so that ethical
behavior becomes a part of their everyday motivational set.  LAMB, supra at 133 (describing the process as one of
“internalization).  The practice appears to be an emotionally reactive (backwardly directed) expression at conduct
(including speech acts) that produce or could produce unwelcome outcomes.  See Strawson, supra note # –. 
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 Throughout this work, I refer to “capacity-in-fact.”  What I mean by the phrase is defined, in part, by its
goal:  to establish a richer view of human potential than the extant legal view.  The view advanced here conduces to
treatment and compassion, and measures cognitive and volitional capacities that acknowledge the need for a more
exacting assessment of the separation of humankind from lower primates.  The new definitions far exceeds the
current test of minimal instrumental capacity, which measures only the ability to effect a simple syllogism.  See e.g.,
Michael Moore, The Moral and Metaphysical Sources of Criminal Law in J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman, eds. NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 20 (New York: N.Y.U. Press, 1985).  The existing standard
measures only the capacity to move from desire to belief to action, which satisfies the requirements of a practical
syllogism.  In this respect, we are barely distinguishable (if at all) from lower primates:  “Primary consciousness –
The ability to generate a mental scene in which a large amount of diverse information is integrated for the purpose of
directing present or immediate behavior – occurs in animals with brain structures similar to ours.”  Gerald M.
Edelman and Giulio Tononi, A UNIVERSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: HOW MATTER BECOMES IMAGINATION 103 (Basic
Books 2000).  See also Joseph LeDoux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL
LIFE 126 (Simon & Schuster 1996).  When we begin to refine our understanding of human intentionality, we
necessarily move toward an appreciation of the benefits of compassion.  On the need for a view of rationality that
includes empathic capacity, see Stephen J. Morse,  Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 264-66
(2000) (arguing for a “generic partial excusing condition” for those who lack a well developed conscience and
capacity for empathy).
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education permits the student with sufficient capacity to internalize a substantial measure
of what it means to hold oneself, and be held, responsible for chosen conduct.5 We usually
know (or at least believe we know) with respect to our own children that when they make
morally relevant choices, they possess the fundamental capacity-in-fact to make important
decisions with at least a reasonable measure of prudence if not yet genuine moral
sensitivity.6 This is a central concern for us as parents and bearers of our culture.
But blame attribution processes also operate when we find fault with individuals who
are not our own wonderful children.  We assign blame to these others when we are
persuaded that they have engaged in misconduct that we condemn and criminalize.
Attributing blameworthiness and criminal wrongdoing to someone whose lives we visit only
briefly and in tragic circumstances – and whose childhoods and opportunities for moral
7
 For a real life, often wrenching description of how this process works with children adjudicated guilty of
violent crimes, see Mark Salzman, TRUE NOTEBOOKS (Knopf 2003) (documenting the author’s two years as a
creative writing teacher in a youth detention center in Los Angeles).
8 See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 34 (Cambridge 1979) (discussing four
species of moral luck, including consequential luck, constitutive luck, antecedent circumstances, and luck in the
testing circumstances one has or has not confronted); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1973-1980, 29 (Cambridge 1981) (rejecting the Kantian hypothesis that good or bad will is
“unconditioned” [or] . . . free from external contingency”); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: A Postscript, in MAKING
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1982-1993, at 241, 241 (Cambridge 1995).  Constitutive
luck, which speaks directly to one’s personality and character,  is discussed infra text accompanying notes –.
9 See Williams, Internal Reasons, supra note # –, at 43 (describing blaming as an advising or “proleptic”
mechanism).
10 On Rawls and the veil of ignorance as a heuristic for achieving distributive justice, see John
Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22, 136-42 (Harvard U. Press 1971); POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia U.
Press 1993); and POLITICAL LIBERALISM 22-8(Columbia U. Press 1993).  See generally, Jean Hampton,
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 137-38 (Boulder: Westview, 1997) (noting that the purpose of the “veil of ignorance” is to
place those making decisions within a position ensuring that “each person in this position [is] ignorant of her place in
society, her particular religious or metaphysical views, her moral beliefs, her social theories and so forth”).  I think
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development we view incompletely, with snapshots rather than lifelong motion pictures –
are qualitatively different practices than those in which we instruct our own children,
although they are still fully human practices.  With respect to these others, we tend to blame
far too readily and too harshly.  For example, when we blame children to whom we offer
unconditional love, our misjudgments are almost always forgivable; these are our children
and, for that reason if no others, we are almost always forgiven too.  The effects of errors
in the judgments we make about others, however, should compel us to exercise
substantially more precision in the blaming process because these decisions often culminate
in harsh, lasting punishment:  lost property and liberty and the pain attendant thereto.  This
need for greater care and precision also obtains because our collisions with the lives of the
others are almost always sudden, almost always unbidden, and so always epistemologically
incomplete; and from the blamer’s perspective, at least, they have lasting effects.7 These
attributions of blame lack the loving judgments we offer our children as we teach them our
norms.  These others are usually total strangers, a substantial number of whom, owing to
bad moral luck,8 reside in a province that lies outside the reach of the learned, ethically-
anticipatory mechanisms we routinely teach our kids:9 lessons we (should) envelope more
in love than anger.  Given these prominent deficits, if the practice of blaming the many
others in our culture operated as it should, with a genuine compassion that recognizes that
these others have often lived tragic lives and with the hoped-for aim of moral and ethical
development, we would blame wrongdoers if, but only if, (a) we had more nearly complete
information – a time lapse portrait instead of a quickly taken Polaroid – covering the
antecedent conditions and events that preceded the wrongful act, M; (b) we were certain
that the wrongdoers had the capacity-in-fact and opportunities to learn the need to avoid
inflicting harm on others; and (c) we were confident that we had genuinely tried to set aside
our own prejudices in the process of ascribing blame.10 We would, in short, demand for all
this requirement is every bit as important for our criminal justice system as it is for our conception of distributive
justice.  See, e.g., James P. Sterba, Retributive Justice, 5 POL. THEORY 349, 353 (1977) (arguing that the “ignorance
condition [might] guarantee fair decisions among persons with conflicting interests. . . . [because] fairness requires
that we discount our own special interests in arbitrating conflict-of-interest situations, and imagining oneself to be
ignorant of those special interests has the same effect”).  I have embraced this approach in other works, including An
Essay on Liberalism and Public Theology, 14 J. LAW & RELIG. 229 (Winter 1999/2000).
11 Compare Sanford H. Kadish, Forward: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 690 (1994) (“The settled moral understanding is that what you deserve is a function of what you
choose.”) with Sanford H. Kadish, Moral Excess in the Criminal Law, 32 McGeorge L.  Rev. 63 (2000) (disproving
of calls to account formally for faultless misconduct attributable to systemic – but currently non-pathological –
deficits).  Accord, e.g., Michael S.  Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1985) (arguing
that “moral responsibility for an action should be ascribed to an actor even when that action was caused by factors
over which he has no control”).
12
 R. Jay Wallace, Moral Psychology,  in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, eds., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY ( Oxford University Press) (page cites unavailable), at www.ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~jwallace/papers/rtf/Moralpsych.rtf.  
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children that which we insist upon unwaveringly for our own.  That we’re not close to
meeting these requirements as a matter of routine criminal justice administration (and
seem sometimes to lack the will even to question the settled ways11) requires us to rethink
the role of blaming as a practice in our criminal law.
This rethinking is especially necessary because the social practice of blaming that we
pursue today expresses a view of moral and social psychology premised in too large a part
on the wrongdoer’s wicked character. In this work, I examine this practice, beginning with
a prominent view from the moral philosophy of blaming, which stresses the bad character
of the wrongdoer.  Next, I look at the semantics of the term character that support blaming
generally; when we unpack the term, we discover an understandably abbreviated but, just
to that extent, woefully incomplete shorthand that conceals deeper problems.  And, finally,
I discuss some of those deeper problems, which often show up as reflections of the social
and cultural biases that we bring to the process of attributing blame.  I present a synthesis
on the practice of blaming from rich data in the social sciences signaling that our blaming
practices tend project our own dispositions for over-emphasizing the actor’s wicked
disposition to wrongdoing in a process that, on balance, doesn’t serve our long term goal
of providing a safer society for ourselves and our children:  by creating conditions that
permit us to over-focus substantially on the bad person rather than the situation, by
providing impetus to an unhelpful penchant for scapegoating, and, foremost, by
undermining our own moral and ultimately political responsibility for the world.  Finally,
I address blaming as part of the paradox of evil and present suggestions for modifying the
extant practices.
II.  A Theory of Blame
One way to pursue issues of moral psychology is to examine a “psychological
phenomenon, and explore its links to normative concepts and assumptions.”12 As Jay
13 Id.
14 See note – and accompanying text infra.
15
 Judith Jarvis Thompson, Morality and Bad Luck, in MORAL LUCK 195 (ed. by Daniel Statman; SUNY
1993).  In his work on moral luck, Nagel notes unexceptionally that we commonly assert that “[a] person can be
morally responsible only for what he does.”  At the same time, however, we know with certainty that “what he does
results from a great deal that he does not do.”  In the end, then, we face a paradox:  The actor “is not responsible for
what he is and is not responsible for.”  On this view, the actor seems to be morally responsible for nothing, because
for much that he does he bears no responsibility – a view which seems to be normatively intolerable despite
descriptive accuracy.  Nagel, supra note # –, at 34.
16 Id. at 200-02.  The undefined term bad is Professor Thompson’s choice.  She offers a variation of this
first formula that focuses instead on being the kind of person who causes an unwelcome event instead of focusing on
causation; that is, a person is to blame for being in a certain way that produces unwelcome outcomes rather than
causing the same.  Although this formulation puts character more clearly into focus, I do not think the differences
matter for present purposes; in the absence of describing “the kind of person who” in terms that explain why he is
“the kind of person who,” in her telling “causing the kind of event which” describes the same personality and
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Wallace notes, “If we wish to understand morality as a normative phenomenon, we must
understand the psychological states and capacities that make it possible for it to regulate
people’s lives in the way it aspires to do.”13 The question here is how does the practice of
blaming connect complex psychological states with developable capacities, on the one hand,
and, on the other, how do both connect with the norms to which we aspire as a
compassionate society.  This section begins with the views of a preeminent moral
philosopher, Judith Jarvis Thompson, and then turns to the work of several contemporary
jurisprudence scholars who advance character-based theories of punishment and excuse.
On the (more or less) conventional view of moral psychology explored here, an actor is
“bad” if he acts in ways that (a) make his conduct more blameworthy than that of a lucky
someone else whose intentions are indistinguishable but produce no harm, and (b) cause
us to believe that his unwelcome conduct reveals an essential deficit in his character.  It
then moves on to consider the merits of this general approach in light of well-replicated
social science data on blaming as a social practice.
Thompson presents her approach to our understanding of blame in an essay on the
effects of moral luck.  She hopes to demonstrate that bad luck concerning one’s antecedent
and constitutive circumstances (roughly genetic and early socio-economic conditions,
respectively14) does not undermine the possibility of fully warranted individual
responsibility.15 Her analysis is helpful but incomplete, and her rhetoric brings to view
some of the unexamined presuppositions that guide her (and us) to the semantics and
attributions of blameworthiness.  Thompson offers two intention-based definitions of
blame in an effort to tame the determinist beast.  The first blame formulation, BF1, states
that a person is to blame for an unwelcome event or state of affairs where that person
caused the event or state of affairs by some wrongful act or omission for which he had no
adequate excuse. The second, alternative formulation, BF2, holds that a person is to
blame for doing something to a greater or lesser extent where his doing that something
gives us a stronger or weaker reason to think he’s a “bad” person.16 BF2, unlike BF1,
character ensemble and set of antecedent events and conditions (or states and capacities).  She makes no such
distinctions, however.
17
 For a discussion of the distinction between “hard” determinism, according to which freedom is an illusion
because all of our conduct is always determined, and “soft” determinism, according to which one can acknowledge
that events have antecedent causes, but maintain nonetheless that in an important sense agents control their own
mental states, even thought those states are themselves causally determined, see P. S. Greenspan, Behavior
Control and Freedom of Action, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 191, 191 n. 1 (ed. by John Martin Fischer;
Cornell 1986).
18
 “Causal determinism is the thesis that, for any given time, a complete statement of facts about that time,
together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to what happens after that time.” 
Fischer and Ravizza, supra note # –, at 14 (arguing, generally, that causal determinism, whether true or not, does not
subvert our common sense understanding of moral responsibility).  Although one could distinguish between
determinism and mechanism, Hilary Bok, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1998), whereby determinism describes
one form of mechanism, I use the two terms synonymously here. 
19
 This, of course, was a task at which Kant ultimately failed.  See H. J. Paton, trans., KANT’S
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAL 117 (New York 1873).  Kant embraced the antinomy of practical
reason which, famously, he reconciled through the fiction of an inaccessible “thing . . . in itself.”  T. K. Abbott,
trans., Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 138-45 (Prometheus Books 1996).  John Rawls commented
that the “weakness” of Kant’s abstraction of the foundations of a “moral law” was in its recognizing “only two
possibilities:  either the moral law is founded on an object given to it,” like Hume’s conception of the “passions,” or
“as pure practical reason determines . . . its own object of itself.”  John Rawls,  LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 235 (ed. by Barbara Herman; Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2000) (hereafter “Rawls, LECTURES”).
20
 The basic analytic conclusion is that if determinism is correct, then blame is always undeserved.  See
generally A. J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, in Watson, supra note # –, at 15.
21
  With Adam Smith, who famously discussed the “irregularity of sentiments” in THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS, supra note # –, at 135, Thompson subscribes to the prevailing view that we judge blameworthiness
based only on intentions and not consequences.  See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: 
Some Bad But Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. (1995); Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment, and
the Role of Result, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 269, 271 (1984) ( “The individual is blameworthy and punishable, on my view,
only for conduct itself, where conduct is construed as a combination of overt action, state of mind (including
intention, knowledge, etc.) and circumstances.”).  See Sanford H. Kadish, Forward: The Criminal Law and the Luck
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stresses the effect on the viewer and raises questions about the compatibilist construct
within which Thomson operates.17
Thompson’s goal is to account for blame in a way that acknowledges causal
determinism18 without succumbing to it.19 In that spirit, she offers two additional theories
to account for (or reject) blaming as a social practice in a world that’s causal all the way
down.  The first, the strong determinist thesis, SDT, holds that blaming is always improper
because personal responsibility is, by definition, lacking; whatever happens must happen.
Thus no misconduct can bring discredit to us.20 She also offers a weak determinist thesis,
WDT, according to which events over which we have no control (luck) matter, but that
nothing we do in consequence thereof sheds any more discredit on us than is shed on us by
our mental acts.21 WDT rests on the reasonably hypothesized conclusion that anytime we
of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994) (arguing that the harm doctrine, whereby punishment varies
based upon the chance that harm does or does not occur, is rationally indefensible).  I have taken up professor
Kadish’s challenge in A Jurisprudence for Punishing Attempts Asymmetrically, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 951 (2003).
22
 In this context, “intentional” refers broadly to our mental interactions with and about the world, not to the
narrow description of statutory criminal mens rea.   See, e.g., Model Penal Code §2.02 (2) (American Law Institute
1985) (defining levels of criminal intent including negligence, recklessness, knowledge and purpose) (hereafter, cited
as “M.P.C.”)
23
 Although she purports to be offering Thomas Nagel’s explanation of moral luck, she takes it on as her
own in an effort to challenge the notion that ordinary events undermine moral responsibility.  Hence she writes
frames the challenge this way:  “Take any person who is engaging in X caused outcome O.  We can always imagine a
second person engaged in X, but whose engaging in X did not cause an outcome of kind O.”  Id. at 199.  The
“wrongful” conclusion is, of course, not incontestable from the perspective of tort law, as the debate between
Holmes and Andrews makes clear.  Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (Ct. App. N. Y. 1928)
(Holmes, J.) with id. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
The theory of action she follows, which accounts for our intentions and potential fault, is fairly
unexceptional, although admittedly thin:  Whatever a person does is either a purely mental act, or is a causing of
some outcome by some mental acts or acts–and that something can be either an act or an answerable omission.  On
this account of action, if one forms the intention of washing clothes in the washing machine and does so, putting the
clothes in the machine was causing the clothes to get washed, which was a product of one’s mental acts, among
which was the intention to wash clothes.  Cf. id. at 199.
24
 Thompson, supra note # – ,  at 208. 
25
 Thompson, supra note # – ,  at 208 (emphasis added).
26 See id.
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can imagine a person, P, intentionally doing M, which causes a bad outcome, O, we can also
imagine another person, P2, undertaking the same M but, for a variety of reasons, P2
fortunately fails to produce a negative result, Ø.22 Accordingly, she concludes that we
should blame P for doing M (where the unfortunate Ming was running over a child when
P backed out of the driveway without looking) but no more than we blame P2 (who also Med
when he backed out of his drive without looking but had the good fortune that no unseen
child was crossing his vehicle’s path); both acted “wrongfully” although P2 happily avoided
the bad outcome.23 
Thompson rejects SDT, which she rightly explains as holding that “whatever . . . [P
or P2] does, the event that consists in his or her doing it has to occur” – a hard determinist
position that undermines moral responsibility entirely.24 Under this view of the world,
Thompson argues, the person who deliberately kills babies for amusement suffers no
discredit and no blame.  She disavows this view because, in her words, “of course” the baby
killer, BK, is a “bad person.”25 SDT can’t be true “if it’s taken to deny the second notion of
‘blame,’” according to which we have good “reason to think [BK] is a bad person.”26
Thompson doesn’t deny that luck plays a formative role in who the actor is at t, the
27 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept,
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand.”).  The Model Penal
Code reflects the prevailing wisdom by requiring convergence of a voluntary act with the statutorily prescribed level
of culpability.  See M. P. C. §§ 2.01(1), 2.02(1).  Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981), has demonstrated, however, that even this bedrock requirement is
subject to manipulation:  the courts often expand or contract the relevant time frame for this convergence to occur as
a matter of public policy.  See, e.g., People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1981) (affirming a conviction for second
degree murder where the defendant knew several hours earlier that he would be driving his car when he left the bar);
People v. Decina, 138 N.E. 2d 799 (N.Y. 1956) (overruling a demurrer to the charge of culpable negligent homicide
where the defendant, “knowing” that he was subject to seizure disorders, chose to drive his car, lost consciousness,
and caused several deaths).
28
 Thompson, supra note # –,  at 211.
29 Id. at 211-12.
30
 J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 , 11 (1956).
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theoretical moment when bad act and criminal intent converge.27 It is this acknowledgment
that leads her to WDT, a view of determinism that permits us to measure blame by those
purely mental acts that produce the misconduct or a chargeable omission.  BF2, because
it is only comparative – Do we have a stronger or weaker reason to believe P is a bad person
compared to P2? – is nonetheless inadequate.  Instead of addressing BF2’s inadequacy
directly, however, she lashes the two formulations of blame to a thin concept of an adequate
excuse.
She accomplishes this tie-in by constructing a theoretical compatibilist link between
BF1 and BF2, which she labels a “connecting thesis” (CT).  CT states that a person is to
blame for some conduct M under BF1 (causing an unwelcome event) if and only if he is in
some way to blame for Ming under definition BF2 (causing us to think he is a “bad
person”) for which there is no adequate excuse.28 Thus the wanton baby killer, BK, is
blameworthy under CT because he caused an unwelcome event that causes us to think he
is a bad person, and he has no excuse for the conduct “since his [killing babies] does give
us reason . . . to think him a bad person.”29 
No one doubts that BK is a “bad” person, as a matter of ordinary usage the world
over.  Austin noted years ago that “ordinary language is not the last word:  in principle it can
everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded;” it is importantly,
however, “the first word.”30 Because it only reflects our pre-evaluative intuitive beginning;
it is defeasible.  CT is not the last word.  Thompson’s pervasive use of the descriptor, bad,
raises at least three questions:  (a) What is an acceptable definition of adequate excuse so
that what at first appears to be bad conduct is excused? (b) Do her hypothetically
inadvertent and morally indistinguishable identical wrongdoers, whose conduct provides
the model for her theory of blame, really apply to brutal BK, despite their different levels
of criminal intent?  Most importantly for present purposes, (c) What is entailed in
concluding that a person is bad? This last question introduces the character theory of
jurisprudence and conditions that define criminality.
31
 In fairness, I do not know what Professor Thompson’s thoughts are about the presumptions of sufficient
capacity for control.  She does not qualify her observations with this question in mind.  For a helpful approach in a
book length treatment, see Bok, supra note # –, at 7, 8-9 & n. 10, who offers a comprehensive theory for
acknowledging free will but states at the outset that she is leaving some questions unaddressed, including the moral
responsibility of the addict who continues to abuse her drug of choice, of those who act under compulsions or
“powerful unconscious motives,” and issues of punishment.
32
 George Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L . REV. 1269, 1271 (1974). 
For a theory of excuses tied to the issue of choice, see generally Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 257 (1987).
33
 This is a point Smith fully elucidated in THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note # –, at 134
(concluding that the “intention or affection of the heart” is all that matters to assess blameworthiness, but that in
“particular cases the actual consequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a great effect upon our
10
One response to (a) is that she leaves substantially undefined the components of an
adequate excuse.  She defines excuse broadly (and admittedly tentatively) as a condition or
event that annuls BF2, conduct that causes us to label the actor “bad.”  Even this hasty
definition is mere tautology; it tells us nothing about the wrongdoer’s capacity-in-fact to
control his mental state.31 Generally, an excuse annuls the wrongdoing because the actor
is, for some reason, not blameworthy:  His conduct reflects some incapacity such that Ming
is viewed as involuntary or unknowing or unintentional.  Excuses typically speak to
involuntariness, not in the sense of the absence of a bodily act, but in the sense of absence
of genuine choice, which “does not accurately reveal the actor’s character,” and thus makes
punishment unjust.32 In the case of blaming BK, often the first issue in question should be
one of capacity-in-fact, a question philosophers tend not to pursue.  
Thompson’s slender definition of an “adequate excuse” is not the only problem.  One
additional difficulty concerns her effort to construct hypothetical examples that reflect
varying levels of intentionality that, in turn, produce equal culpable states between actions
and omissions among her paired, hypothetical wrongdoers; another addresses her
unanalyzed choice of metaphors.  The first responds to the hypothetical situations she
constructs as a platform for her illustrations of comparative blameworthiness; they are too
imprecise to support her all-purpose notion of badness. Her hypothothesized examples of
wrongdoing are intended to illustrate levels of individual blameworthiness that are, from
the standpoint of moral accounting, comparatively indistinguishable across the broad
expanse of culpable intent, and this project would fulfill the demands of CT. Her examples
fall short of supporting her goal; their basic impulse is far too formal.
She begins convincingly by demonstrating that the hapless motorist, P, whose Ming
consists of failing to look into his rearview mirror before backing out of the drive, is neither
more nor less guilty of wrongdoing than lucky P2, whose identical Ming luckily inflicts no
harm.  Her approach at the inadvertence end of the intent continuum is well taken; we all
suffer from self-condemnation and with corresponding feelings of self-blame (but usually
less, in varying degrees, than it might have been if the harm had unfortunately come to
pass).33 Causing pain to others does and should bring pain to us even when the act
sentiments concerning . . . merit or demerit, and almost always enhance or diminish our sense of both”).  I have
discussed this at length in terms of the aesthetics of retribution in Aesthetics of Retribution, supra note # at 243-47
(surveying some of the implications of the positions of Smith and Hume on the normativity of a naturalist approach
to moral philosophy). 
34 See Andre, supra note # –.
35 Cf. R. A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 L. AND PHIIL. 345, 348 (1993) (stating that
liability for criminal negligence does not require choice unless negligence is defined in the pluperfect – she would
have chosen to avoid do M if she had made a choice).  And that conclusion would beget a “recklessness” charge
from many quarters.
Nor does a classic utility approach, which finds rationality in the ability to determine one’s own immediate
hedonic needs.  On the classic side, see Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, supra note # –, Ch. XV, §1, at 83, who
stated in summary form: 
(a) All laws should promote happiness, i.e., net social gain;
(b) Punishment itself does not promote happiness;
(c) Therefore, laws requiring punishment should be enforced 
       only when doing so otherwise promotes happiness, i.e.
       produces a net social gain.  
One need not assume that utility, defined as aggregate happiness, is purely hedonic.  See, e.g., John Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules , 44 PHIL. REV. 3, 9 (1955) (amending the utility principle to make clear that it is not purely
hedonic, and thereby providing utilitarian theory with a rationale that would  prevent punishing the innocent).
Finally, there is no neurobiological support for a distinct human-ness that guarantees civility.   See note –
supra (discussing the phenomenon of “primary consciousness”).
36
 In fact, Thompson goes to some lengths to describe P, P2, and P3 (also inadvertent) as generally careful
drivers who were momentarily distracted.  Thompson, supra note –, at 196-98.
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producing the harm is unintentional and non-malevolent, albeit insensitive.34 Her
argument becomes more difficult, however, when she transports a description of
blameworthiness created in the context of empty-headedness to the context of baby killing;
the relative blameworthiness of these two instantiations of intention is unstable.  No longer
are we assessing the blameworthiness of an empty or other- directed but relatively normal
mind; with BK we are viewing the impact of a mind filled with crazed deliberations of the
most motivationally repugnant even unimaginable form:  pain for its own sake or, equally
deplorable, without any concern at all about the harm imposed relative to some perverse
immediate benefits gained.35 When we describe a person as bad in the context of
inadvertence, we are mostly describing the unwelcome effect of oversight.  The examples
she uses initially to establish WT arise in situations where P and P2 have the same legal
duties to avoid Ming:  that is, to keep a careful lookout.  Thus the description of their
misconduct as bad speaks mostly to the effect of their breach of duty and not (necessarily)
to their general characters or dispositions;36 for there but for the grace of God go any one
of us.  In stark contrast, when we talk about BK, we are addressing a qualitatively different
species of wrongfulness. 
37 See M. P. C. §2.02 (2) (a & b) (distinguishing between conduct that is undertaken with either the purpose
– “conscious object” – or the knowledge – “practical certainty” that prohibited conduct or results will occur).
38 See, e.g., Insanity Defense By Dahmer Fails, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 16 1992, sec. 1, part 1; col.6;
Report Documents Dahmer’s Cannibalism, U.P.I., Aug., 4, 1991; online at
www.geocities.com/donnysmith.geo/dahmer.html; www.arminm.com/jeffrey_dahmer.htm.
39
 Andrea Yates is the Houston mother who drowned her five young children with the hope that doing so
would provide for their salvation.  See Transcript of Andrea Yates’ Confession, Feb. 21, 2002 at
www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/drownings.  
On her background and those of her husband and “spiritual advisor,” see A Mother's Madness - Andrea Yates, at
www.courttv.com/onair/shows/mugshots/episodes/yates.html.  
In brief, Yates was described by friends as a “wonderful mother;” they didn’t know how hard she struggled
with debilitating depression, a depression that produced psychotic delusions. Andrea Yates suffered from
“postpartum depression,” a condition which, in less severe forms, effects many women after childbirth; in severe
forms, it can induce psychotic states.  She killed all five of her young children, one at a time, by holding their heads
under water in the same family bathtub where she had bathed them during the days and weeks and months and years
of ignored warnings that preceded her fatal crisis.  A devout fundamentalist Christian, she followed her husband’s
and their spiritual adviser’s mantra – “God will take care of us!” – and had yet another child despite increasingly
difficult bouts of depression and decomposition after the births of her first four children.  Following the birth of their
fifth child, she came to the bizarre conclusion that she (now clearly losing her struggle with sanity) was possessed by
Satan and was causing her children irreparable and eternal damage.  Guided by the singular logic of her unique
psychosis, she decided that the only chance they had of getting to heaven required her to kill them one by one, a task
she completed despite considerable struggle.  The examining psychiatrist agreed with the state that at least in some
moments, Yates knew that it was legally wrong to murder her children, but she believed she had no choice: 
“Because of her dilemma, what she perceived as right was to take her children’s [sic.] life on earth to prevent them
12
Thompson does offer a mid-level, apparently transitional example of bad intent
(between a motorist’s inadvertence and perverse baby killing) when she includes within her
moral model the mental acts of two hypothetical judges, J and J2, both equally prepared
(and willing) to accept a bribe and undermine justice.  This reflects a level of intent akin to
“knowledge” at least.37 Of the two, only J is actually approached with and offered a bribe;
J accepts.  She argues, again, that J2's mental acts makes him equally as culpable as J
because J2 also was willing to accept the bribe.  This example of advertent, intentional
wrongdoing moves her thesis closer to a general approach that supports CT than does the
example of the distracted neglectful drivers, but I think the case of the corruptible judges
also presents a different characterological matter than does the case of the gleeful baby-
killers.  The case of J and J2 illustrates uncommon but motivationally intelligible greed, a
common form of culpability and a tendency most people have had to tame at one time or
another.  The comparison with the enraptured Jeffrey Dahmer-like,38 motivationally
unintelligible butchery fails, however, because it raises all sorts of psychopathological and
neurobiological issues that the conduct of J and J2 does not implicate.  We more clearly
understand J than we do BK.
Baby killing as sport is for any reason “bad” beyond the imaginations of most of us.
It is the unfathomable taking of a human life – someone’s cherished, innocent child – for
no reason, not even an explicable Andrea Yates-like psychotic reason.39 The baby killer
from eternal damnation.”  According to psychiatric testimony, Yates believed at times that she would sacrifice her
life to save her children from damnation.  “She was afraid Satan would hear it and make it happen.”  Yates was
deemed “sane;” competency was not an issue.
40
 And so the retributive emotion that’s triggered by the idea of frivolous baby killing is undeniable in its
existence (even if the conduct Thompson describes is, thankfully, rare.)   I take this topic up directly in Some
Thoughts on the Aesthetics of Retribution, 17 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 233 (2004).  It is true that negligent killings also
may evoke retributive emotions but not (ordinarily) vengeful ones; we tend to address negligent deaths through
money damages rather than incarceration or worse.
41
 Moreover, unlike the careless but fortunate driver, with whom we can all sympathize and advance some
reproach, there is no deliberate baby killer who has the good fortune of not killing – or at least of causing grave harm
to – an infant he hopes to kill, unless BK2 is caught prior to inflicting harm.
42
 The account of reactive attitudes I describe below begins with Strawson, supra, note # –.  For chilling
portraits of psychopathic personalities, see R. D. Hare, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE
PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US Ch. 1 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). 
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causes great (if brief) pain to the deceased child, and massive theretofore unimaginable,
life-changing pain to the baby’s parents, families, and friends.  This unvarnished description
of pain produces an emotional aesthetic that is often uncabinable and immeasurable.40
Here the context for Thompson’s definitions of blame blurs important distinctions.  First,
unlike P and P2 (the negligent drivers) or even the corruptible judges, J and J2, it is difficult
even to imagine a BK2 for every BK; that is, we can only barely imagine a BK, much less
BK2, whose misconduct consists in only attempting to kill babies for fun; and unlike the
distracted driver or the greedy judge, we cannot imagine at all what motivates these
hypothetical baby killers.41 Second, excuses speak only indirectly to the bad label we place
on the actor’s conduct – that is, to whether we have a stronger or weaker reason to think
he’s a bad person.  Rather, they speak to the actor’s mental state, traditionally whether he
was ignorant or coerced or mistaken or the like.  We excuse him, in part, because he was not
acting like himself or he was acting involuntarily or he lacked significant cognitive or
suffered a significant deficit in volitional control.  Short of something like an unforeseen
heart attack or other genuinely involuntary act, there simply is no excuse for the inadvertent
drivers, P or P2.
The same, paradoxically, cannot be said of BK.  No one doubts the badness of BK’s
character or of Dahmer’s or of the barbarity of their crimes, at least as a matter of common
expression.  No feeling, caring, even marginally empathic human can harbor such a desire,
much less the demand that it be gratified with such gruesomeness.42 If that conclusion is
accurate, and it must be, then we should pursue a deeper question, which Thompson omits:
What aberrant synergies of poor environment and faulty neurocircuitry make it possible for
any actor to achieve a state of mind that produces insatiable desire and joy from the
purposeful act of killing precious innocent babies?  So framed, to call the actor bad or evil
is to say, metaphorically, that he is theologically irredeemable, a statement we cannot make
about P or P2. Thus we should ask the common sense question:  How did this person BK
get so sick?  And if we agree that BK (or Dahmer or Yates and others) are sick, what
ingredient in the nature of blaming is served by blaming him?  Blaming those who lack the
43
 Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS,
265 (ed. by Ferdinand Schoeman; Cambridge 1987) (hereafter, “Watson, Responsibility”)). 
44
 There might yet be a certain population against whom we cannot defend ourselves, see [ARYAN
NATION ARTICLE]; and as to their fate and its moral metric, I do not know..
45 See Matt Ridley, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, & WHAT MAKES US HUMAN
(HarperCollins 2003) (describing the we are genetically coded to responded to environmental stimuli) [hereafter,
“NATURE VIA NURTURE”]. 
46 See Sheri L. Beinstock, Mothers Who Kill Their Children Postpartum Psychosis, 32 SW. U. L.
REV. 451 (2003).
47
 On Harris’s life, see Miles Corwin, Icy Killer’s Life Steeped in Violence, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 16,
1982 (reprinted in Watson, Responsibility, supra note # –, at 268-71, 272-74).  Corwin presents the following
portrait:  Harris was the product of cruelly abusive chronic alcoholic parents.  His mother not only refused to permit
him to make any physical contact with her ever, she blamed him, the youngest of nine children, for all her suffering. 
His father, never willing to accept that his youngest child Robbie was his progeny, kicked his mother in the stomach
while the child was in utero.  Later that same night the child was born and nearly died.  His sister recalled that as a
beautiful young child all Robbie had ever wanted was love from someone – anyone.  He never received it.  Twenty
five years after his rude birth, Harris brutally and senselessly murdered two young teens and then calmly ate their
lunches.  His fellow death row inmates were so disconcerted by Harris’s demeanor that they cheered his impending
death.  
On the issue of environmental effects, see Ridley, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra note # –.   See also
Antonio R. Damasio, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (HarperCollins 1994)
(discussing the somatic marker thesis); Joseph LeDoux’s, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE
(2002).  
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capacity-in-fact for moral understanding is pointless, not in all instrumental senses
because, as noted above, we do blame our children when we ascribe accountable fault to
them for producing an unwelcome event of state of affairs.  Rather, to blame BK is an empty
gesture inasmuch as the point of blaming is to communicate resentment; there is no
communication possible with certain people,43 at least without an effort at offering
substantial long term assistance, or killing.  Why then do we so quickly determine badness
without considering the conditions and events – the whole biographies, insofar as that
information is available – of actors who behave badly?  What conditions and events
produced these wretched characters?44
The deficiencies they experience combine unfortunate events with unfortunate
conditions.45 Reflect momentarily on the background of Andrea Yates, who suffered from
a psychotic state that was induced by repeated, tragically under-examined bouts of
postpartum depression;46 or on Robert Alton Harris’s, whose childhood was as devoid of
love as it was occupied with and impacted by hate and abuse;47 or on Jeffrey Dahmer’s,
whose genetic defects caused him to commit totally unfathomable acts:  carving, storing,
and cannibalizing his victims.  These tragic figures could not have caused their own
deranged characters, at least not in any identifiably linear fashion.  In fact, if we accept the
determinist premise that Thompson hopes to corral, that every event has a cause and that
48
 Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will , supra note # –, at (1989).  Accord e.g., Thomas Nagel, WHAT DOES
IT ALL MEAN? 55-7 (Oxford 1987); Hilary Bok, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 201 (1998) (“The supposition that
we were caused to choose as we did by something other than ourselves implies that we are not free.  The supposition
that we caused them to occur simply pushes the problem back.”); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of
Causation and Results, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 879, 881 (2000) (“No one is a prime mover unmoved.”).  
49 Compare Robert McAfee Brown, Introduction, in Elie Wiesel, THE TRIAL OF GOD xvi (New York:
Schocken Books, 1995) (“I do not have any answers,” Wiesel acknowledged, “but I have some very good
questions.”). 
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every cause has a prior cause all the way down, the very notion of self-causation is either
absurd or meaningless.  Galen Strawson explains why:
[T]o be truly deserving of . . . praise or blame for our actions, . . . we must be
truly responsible for how we are mentally [for our intentions.]  We must be
genuine ‘originators’ of ourselves. . . . But the attempt to describe how we
could [possibly] be true originators of ourselves . . . leads to infinite regress
. . . for even if one could somehow choose how to be, . . . one would . . .
already have to have existed prior to that choice, with a certain set of
preferences about how to be.  But then the question would arise:  where did
these preferences come from?  Or were they just there, unchosen preferences
for which one was not responsible?  And so on.48
As the next section indicates, self-causation, Aristotle’s hook on character and its
impact, ultimately makes no sense.  And still, the irregularity of our sentiments being what
they are, we blame Yates and Harris and Dahmer and BK for their demented characters.
Why?  Clearly, neither determinism nor indeterminism as heuristic categories provides a
dispositive answer.  In fact, when we contemplate the breakdown that occurred in the lives
of these individuals, we should be concerned with determining the sources of their crazy
preferences.  There may be no complete answers to this inquiry, but I think there are at
least some good questions, including why we blame those who often lack the necessary
capacity-in-fact for volitional control.49 
III.  Character and the Semantics of Blame
What do we think we mean, and what do we have reason to know we mean, when we
say that an actor is “bad” or that he has a bad character; that he deserves our condemnation;
and, therefore, that he should be blamed and punished for his wrongdoing?  One response
is that he has done a harmful or potentially harmful unwelcome act that causes us to believe
he is a bad person.  Thompson’s conclusion is analytically objectionable and ontologically
incomplete.  Many commentators go beyond Thompson’s modest proposal, which stresses
a helpful regime of normatively comparative culpability judgments, and insist that we
should punish actors only (and always) when their misconduct and subsequent bad choices
50
 For useful surveys and critiques of character theories generally, see R. A. Duff, Do We Want an
Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147 (2002); Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability,
supra note # –.
51
 Aristotle, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS iii.5.1114a3-11 (Trans. by David Ross Oxford, 1987), maintained that
by virtue of their slackardly dispositions, men are “responsible for becoming men of that kind.”  For a
neurologically-informed critique of this view, see Carl Elliott, THE RULES OF INSANITY: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 29-31 (Suny 1996) (noting that “in many ways we are clearly not responsible for our
characters, at least as Aristotle implies”).  Id. at 30.
52
 David Hume, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 411 (L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, eds.; Oxford
2nd ed. 1978).   On Hume’s particular brand of utilitarian thinking, see Paul Russell, Hume on Responsibility and
Punishment, 20 CAN. J. PHILOS. 539 (1990). 
53 Id. at 468-69.
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reflect a defect of character (or dispositions or personality).50 This issue is both chronic,
inasmuch as it implies the existence of a non-controversial rule or standard of
measurement, and always acute because for many people the conclusion that a wrongdoer
is “bad” or “just bad” provides a sufficiently accurate description of character to justify not
only blame but imprisonment:  locking up defendants who have been adjudicated guilty and
throwing away the key.  There are at least two replies to the questions that begin this
paragraph:  one combines a contemporary rule utilitarian outlook on excuses with a thin
formal Kantian view of capacity-in-fact; the other proceeds cautiously, responding to
widespread social psychological and semantic phenomena entailed in our practice of
blaming.  I address the two responses in that order, and then take up an issue hinted at and
implied throughout my critique:  the paradoxical nature of evil and its relation to the regime
of excusing misconduct.
A.  A brief look at the jurisprudential account of character – In his ETHICS, Aristotle
insisted that individuals are responsible for their own characters because their actions
establish their character.51 Hume advanced a related idea in the TREATISE: “Actions are by
their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause
in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform’s them, they . . . can neither
redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil.”52 He elaborated the dispositional
viewpoint with an example of homicide.
Take any action allow’d to be vicious:  Wilful murder, for instance.  Examine
it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact , . . . which you call
vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives,
volitions and thoughts.  There is no other matter of fact in the case.  The vice
entirely escapes you . . . till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and
find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, toward this action.
It lies in yourself, not in the object.53
Hume’s view is that we disapprove of BK’s conduct not because it is vicious; rather, we
identify it as vicious because we, in turning to our own dispositions (our “breasts”),
54
 Christine M. Korsgaard, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 50 (Cambridge 1996).
55
 On rule utilitarian thought, see John Rawls, Rule Utilitarianism, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT 82 (ed. by Gertrude Ezorsky State University of N. Y. Press 1972) (originally published as Two
Concepts of Rules, 44 PHILOS. REV. 3 (1955) (distinguishing between justifications for the practice of punishment
generally, and particular applications, and defending utilitarianism as an explanation for moral judgments
thereunder); John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3, 9-
10 (N.Y.U. Press 1964) (defining the duty of fair play as a scheme in which everyone benefits by mutual social
cooperation and in which everyone or nearly everyone accepts certain restrictions on liberty to enjoy the benefit
which is, in a sense, free, that is, the situation is unstable to the extent that one person knows that he can fail to
cooperate but still enjoy the benefit).
56
 Richard B. Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHILOS. REV. 337, 354 (1969) (emphasis in the
original).  Although I believe that the debate between character and choice theorists is substantially overinflated, see,
e.g., Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, supra note # –, I am assuming that character is a relevant
factor in the search for blame, especially when the issue of excusing misconduct arises.  See, e.g., M. P. C., cmt. to
§2.04, at 275 (noting that the excuse of mistake of law applies when the “act charged is consistent with the entire
law-abidingness of the actor”); id. §210.3, at 55 (stating that provocation acknowledges that “one who kills in
response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character
deficiency than one who kills in their absence”). 
57
 Brandt, supra note # –, at 354 (emphasis added).
58 Id. 
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disapprove of it.54 Morality, according to the Humean view, resides in us, in our characters
and dispositions.  Such a determination would be relatively unimpeachable if all who are
judged bad possessed control-in-fact over their characters.
In his oft cited work, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, Richard Brandt follows this
Humean line, arguing for a rule-utilitarian theory of excuses according to which moral
demerit is judged by the following dictum:55 “An agent is morally blameworthy . . . for an
act if, and to the degree that, the moral code the currency of which in that society would
maximize utility would condemn . . . him for it.”56 Condemnation is appropriate, on this
view, whenever the actor lacks an internalized motivational system that should produce
appropriate feelings of guilt or shame or dishonor and the like in response to conduct that
violates the moral code, absent a traditional assessment of excuse.  Motivation is key; an
agent’s conduct is excusable, therefore, if but only if, “an objectively wrong action (or an
action in some way out of order) . . . does not manifest some defect of character.”57
Brandt’s description of character, which he distinguishes from “just a trait of personality,”58
is terse; it is some internal quality that goes beyond a trait to include more or less
permanent dispositions, so that for Brandt the crucial moral question is whether or not
people would be “trained to be motivated, and to feel, in certain ways about certain things,
namely, to have an aversion to breaking a promise, to feel guilty about doing so,” that is, to
act according to utility-maximizing rules of conduct.  Implicit in this approach is the
Aristotelian-Humean belief that the explanation for conduct reflecting character is internal
to the actor and his desires, even if not fully within his control.  On Brandt’s view, “a defect
59
 Brandt, supra note # –, at 355 (emphasis added).  Brandt’s survey of excusing conditions is fairly typical
except insofar as he presses the motivational button: “All the considerations traditionally recognized as exculpating
excuses are ones evidencing adequate motivation – or at least showing absence of evidence of inadequate
motivation.”  Id. at 357.  Notably absent is serious consideration of volitional deficits or how they are acquired.  In
fact, is understanding of a motivational defect begs the question how it came about:  “For part of what it is to blame a
person is to impute a defect to him – and a defect is a dispositional feature of him, an incapacity or deleterious
tendency.”  Id. at 385 (emphasis in the original).
60
 Part of my critique of Brandt’s view is a reaction to its neurobiological naivete.  No serious
neuroscience scholar doubts that genetic endowment, for example, plays a substantial role in the
construction of personality.  See, e.g. David Wasserman and Robert Wachbroit, Introduction: Methods, Meaning,
and Morals, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 1, 12-13 (ed. by David Wasserman and Robert Wachbroit:
Cambridge 2001); Kenneth Taylor, On the Explanatory Limits of Behavioral Genetics, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR, supra at 117, 125-26 (summarizing data that suggest that some criminality reflects defects in an
individual’s “basic cognitive or affective architecture, citing B. Maughan, Childhood Precursors of Aggressive
Offending in Personality-Disordered Adults in S. Hodgins, MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIME (1993) (noting that while
only 7% of the general population suffers from antisocial personality disorder, 45% of a population of convicted
violent felons so suffer)); M. Virkkunnen aand M. Linnoila, Serotonin in Personality Disorders with Habitual
Violence and Impulsivity in Hodgins, supra (linking habitual aggressive behavior with reduced serotonin levels); and
J. Volavka, D. Martell, and A. Convit, Psychobiology of the Violent Offender, 7 J. FORENSIC SCI. 237 (1992)
(suggesting that reduced serotonin follows from a genetic mutation)).  Yet it is precisely these developments that our
jurisprudence is just now beginning to take any cognizance of.  See note – infra (sources cited).
61 Cf.  Brandt, supra note # –,  at 351-52 (stating that excuses entail societal costs insofar as the wrongdoer
or potential wrongdoer believes that the clever lawyer will help him use the excuse to avoid incarceration). 
62
 Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 MIND 198 (1986).
63
 Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 38 (Cambridge 1979) (originally published in 50
PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (Supp. 1976)). 
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of character is, or includes, a defect of motivation.”59 Presumably this means that the actor
could have learned appropriate conduct but failed to do so because he lacked the
appropriate motivational reinforcement.  (In fact, whether any particular individual could
be trained, in the sense that he has adequate capacities-in-fact for cognition and volitional
control and has had the opportunity to learn same, is not an issue on which Brandt opines.60
I suspect, though, that the dual requirements of capacity-in-fact do not present him with
a forbidding hurdle.61)
Working in a similar vein, Norvin Richards dismisses the importance of constitutive
luck on our assessments of human conduct.62 (Constitutive luck describes the conventional
understanding that our “inclinations, capacities, and temperament” – those relatively
permanent qualities that some distance toward composing us – are to some immeasurable
extent outside our control.63) Along with Brandt, Richards argues that such factors would
count as exculpating, but only “if one’s character is to no extent one’s own artefact.  But if
the individual makes any contribution whatever to the sort of person he is, that
64
 Richards, supra note # –, at 202 (emphasis in the original).
65 Id. (emphasis added).   George Fletcher’s approach to excuses indicates similar views, although his final
account is unclear.  Stated in summary form, Fletcher contends that because punishment is justified only if measured
in terms of desert, where desert is a measure of character, we are required to make a judgment about the actor’s
character whenever we adjudicate the propriety of excusing certain conduct.  George Fletcher, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW §10.3.2, at 800 (1978).  The points of view taken here are akin to, if not instantiations of, what
Professor Susan Wolf describes as the “deep-seated view” of the free self, according to which we are responsible for
our actions not only because they are intentional, but also because they are necessary reflections of a will that
expresses our deep seated character traits.  Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS, supra note # –, at 46, 47-50 (discussing the work of Harry
Frankfort, Gary Watson and Charles Taylor).  As Wolf points out, these positions, like those discussed above, leave
open the question: “Who, or what, is responsible for this deeper self?”  Id. at 51 (concluding that the ability to step
back and contemplate our own actions, the standard reply, is insufficient).
66
 Perhaps Professor Richards meant no such thing.  Perhaps he has or would recommend issues related to
cub-pathological capacity deficits be dealt with at sentencing.  See, e.g., §5K.2.13, SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (permitting a departure for “significantly reduced mental capacity,” provided, inter alia, that the offense
charged is non-violent).  If that is the case, then, we must (at the very least) reappraise the propriety of the
assumptions in our fairly non-discretionary Sentencing Guidelines.  See, e.g.,  Thomas W. Hutchison, David Yellen,
Deborah Young, and Matthew R. Kipp, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 5, pt. H (St. Paul: West,
1999) (excluding from consideration the conditions in which  wrongdoers, through accidents of birth alone, are
raised and receive – or do not receive – a moral education).  At worst, we must ask if he hasn’t buried issues related
to the presumption that we can genuinely ascribe moral responsibility more deeply and less rationally than it is
presently.
19
contribution can be the basis of for his deserving . . . blame for what he does.”64 Although
he concedes that bad luck plays some role in determining one’s character, he opines that we
can also make wrong choices, and it is the “wrong part” of human conduct that he want to
take “seriously.”65 
Richards’ implicit proposition – that excuses are proper only if our character is “to
no extent” of our own making and are inappropriate, therefore, if one’s character makes any
contribution whatever to our own authorship – raises at least three separate but related
questions that intrude directly upon our judgments about blameworthiness and criminality.
The questions implicate (a) the ontological proposition that we are to some extent the
authors of our own lives; and (b) epistemologically-informed metaethical/ethical questions
of (i) whether we possess the tools to recognize correctly those features over which we do
and do not have authorial control, and (ii) whether we can, therefore, accurately attribute
particular instances of misconduct to those circumstances over which we have such control
and, thereafter, impose justifiable penalties on account of that over which we do exert
control.66 Simply to clarify, much less disentangle the polycentric issues embedded within
the phrases “to no extent” or “makes any contribution whatever” illustrates the difficulties
with this position.  For example, while I readily accept the “authorial” premise (a) as given,
at least when the agent has sufficient cognitive capacity-in-fact and opportunities to develop
a mature conscience, I cannot embrace propositions (b) or (c) because recognizing such
features and genuinely attributing responsibility are far more difficult than the Brandt-
Richards position allows, a point I take up shortly. 
67 Cf. Elkhonon Goldberg, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 150 (Oxford,
2001) (suggesting that data from neuroscience require a “new legal construct of ‘inability to guide one’s behavior
despite the availability of requisite knowledge’ may be needed to capture the peculiar relationship between frontal
lobe dysfunction and the potential for criminal behavior”).  See id. at 108-09 (describing a phenomenon
characterized by the “non-pathological diminution of the ability to form a theory of the mind,” i.e., the inability to
sense how others are reacting internally to us as reflecting “normal variability” in frontal lobe functioning).
68 See John M. Darley and Thomas P. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41 ANNU. REV.
PSYCHOL. 525, 541-45 (1990) (discussing research on how children learn moral rules); Yoram Shachar, The
Fortuitous Gap in Law and Morality, 6 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 12, 24 (1987) (surveying Piaget’s work among others
and speculating that “human morality, once autonomously developed and formed, remains so in some areas of
conduct, while other authorities replace parental authority in other areas and create in the human mind the same
subservient nonautonomous opinion which is a mere reflection of external manifestations of attitude by such
authorities”).  As Daniel Goleman, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE xiii (1995) notes, “the neurological data suggest [the
existence of] a window of opportunity for shaping our children’s emotional habits.”
Note, in this regard, the increasingly questionable but persistent unstated assumption of adequate parental or
adult authority.  On the other end of the developmental chain, there is some evidence that genetic engineering may be
employed to improve some aspects of personality that one does not like.  See Martha Nussbaum, Brave Good World,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 4, 2000, at 38 (reviewing Allen Buchanan, Dan W.  Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel
Wikler, FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE (Cambridge U. Press 2000)).
69
 Bernard Williams makes this point about the instability of character judgments made at, or in reference
to, a fixed point in time, in terms of the criteria needed to make such a determination:
[W]hat one does and the sort of life one leads condition one’s later desires and judgments.  The
standpoint of that retrospective judge who will be my later self will be the product of my earlier
choices.  So there is no set of preferences both fixed and relevant, relative to which the various
fillings of my life-space can be compared.  If the fillings are to be evaluated by reference to what I
variously . . . want, the relevant preferences are not fixed, while if they are to be evaluated by what
I now . . . want, this will give a fixed set of preferences, but one that is not necessarily relevant.
Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1973-1980, 29 (Cambridge 1981)
(rejecting, generally, the Kantian hypothesis that good or bad will is “unconditioned” [or] . . . free from external
contingency”).
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All of the basic questions raised by this view of character rest on the problematic
assumption that all those wrongdoers whom the law deems sane and competent – BK,
Yates, Harris, Dahmer and the like – have both control over their character and that
character in general is relatively stable over time.67 Although the latter point is
contestable,68 one can suppose for now that one’s moral development goes through stages
and becomes more-or-less fixed at some point in time with respect to at least some areas
of conduct.  Even if this is correct, however, the point overlooks or dismisses as
unimportant an incontrovertible fact:  Who we are at t, the moment of wrongdoing on
which we focus for rendering moral and legal accounts, is a function of all the antecedent
influences whose impact on the decision made at t are certain, albeit not fully discernible
in the aggregate.69 Nor will it do to claim, as many do, that because determinism is
70 See, e. g., Moral Excess s, supra note # –,  75-6 McGeorge L.  Rev. 63 (2000); Moore, Causation and
the Excuses, supra note # –, at 1092 (arguing that “moral responsibility for an action should be ascribed to an actor
even when that action was caused by factors over which he has no control”); Morse, Moral Metaphysics, supra note
# –, at 886. 
71
 This is a basic fact of our genes and neurobiology.  See, e.g., Ridley, supra note # –; Damasio,  supra
note # –.
72
 Thomas Nagel, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 115 (New York: Oxford 1986).  See also Thomas Nagel,
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? 51 (New York: Oxford 1987).
73
 Even our ordinary, everyday usage underscores this fact.  We routinely talk to our friends and neighbors
across fences – and without ever second-guessing ourselves (a human quality of mixed virtue) – about our genetic
make-ups, including our likenesses to Mom or Dad (“like father, like son,” “the acorn never falls far from the tree,”
and so on), to our sisters or brothers, and the variations nature has carved out among our siblings.  On the importance
of family selection studies, see, e.g., Robert Plonim, NATURE AND NURTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 38-41 (Pacific Grove, Cal: Brooks/Cole Publ. Co. 1990).
74 See, e.g., Richards, supra note # –, at 200 (defining character as a person’s “set of preferences, in so far
as these are relatively stable over time”). 
75
 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S.  184, 197 (1964) (declining to define the term “obscenity,” but noting that “I
know it when I see it.”) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
76
 Brandt, for example, fully discusses character as a factor in making moral assessments, but gives short
shrift to its definition by declaring that it reflects “relatively enduring response tendenc[ies]” revealed in contexts rife
with moral implications.  Richard Brandt, ETHICAL THEORY 466 (Prentice Hall 1959).  Note that this “definition”
moves backwards, from effect to cause; it follows from a purported effect that assumes character as its cause. 
Richards defines character simply as one’s “set of preferences, in so far as these are relatively stable over time.” 
Richards, supra note # –, at 200.  For a generally sympathetic (but not fully convinced) view of Brandt’s theory, see
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universal and affects all of us, it can be dismissed.70 For now, suffice it to say that
“universal” is not the same as “uniform.”  We are each affected uniquely:  some for better,
some for worse.71 This brute social fact of existence challenges our conception of freedom
because the conventional wisdom posits that free actions “should not be determined by
antecedent conditions and should be fully explained only intentionally, in terms of
justifying reasons and purposes.”72 Yet antecedent events and conditions obviously do
matter greatly, and everyone knows it; our well nurtured intuitions shout out this basic
understanding routinely.73 Even our discourse about character and personality betrays the
incompleteness of our current understanding of blameworthiness, an incompleteness in its
expressions and judgments and, ultimately, in its practical wisdom.
B.  The abbreviated semantics of character – Perhaps it is not surprising that
character theorists tend not to define character with great rigor.74 It’s a wobbly term, the
contours of which are just now giving way to serious study.  So, like the late Justice Potter
Stewart, they assume that they recognize the impact of character when they see it,75 and
they know it for certain when it produces an unwelcome outcome; that is to say, blamers
tend to reason in a post hoc ergo propter hoc manner.76 The task of attributing blame
Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-Based Theories of Criminal Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 35, 47-59 (1998).
77
 Most of the discussion in this section is based on Adam Morton, Character and the Emotions, in
EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 153, 155 (ed. by Amélie O. Rorty; Cal 1980). 
78 Id.
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based on misconduct that reflects the bad content of one’s character is a tricky business, as
likely to reveal those cognitive biases of the observer as it is the bad character of the actor.
In this section, I look first at the complex nature of describing fully one’s character.
Thereafter I report on the social psychology of bias that accompanies attributions of blame.
The search for an individual’s bad character commonly appears in our folk
psychological usages as familiar shorthand expressions that serve as proxies for rich
descriptions of complex human behavior.  This idiomatic simplicity meets our immediate
needs to release anger, define blame, evoke shame, and move on.  We use naive terms to
describe one’s “character” – such as sweet or shy or considerate or clumsy or surly or
vicious or bad – when we want to say something about the observed actor’s supposed
intentions sufficiently general so that we then can use our own experiences and
imaginations to fill in the epistemic gaps in our attributions of character.  That is, we use
familiar metaphors in lieu of fully informed psychological explanations.  These semantic
shortcuts serve us well enough in everyday conversation, but they well fall short as accurate
descriptions and thus fail to meet our normative goal as a flourishing, compassionate,
justice-seeking community.  
The semantic case is made in part (and reluctantly) by Adam Morton, who notes that
the function of conceptions of character in psychological explanation is “to block, qualify,
or emphasize the connection between beliefs and desires that an explanation appeals to and
the actions it explains.”77 We use general descriptions of character traits that reveal some
relatively common patterns of observation relevant to the peculiarities of different
incidents.  In this partially-informed way, our common metaphors permit the attributor to
avoid describing character in behavioral terms.  The simple explanation for this process is
that fully-described behavioral states always seem “too complex for a quick explanation.”78
So terms like “brutal,” “vicious,” “angry,” “short-tempered,” and “bad” generally truncate
discussions about the compound states that actually generate behavior.  Instead, we find
quick familiar (visible) connections between complex internal states and the actions we
observe.  We use the distancing term “character” in lieu of dealing with the “person” of the
accused.
In a general though still incomplete way, we follow this condensed approach because
a genuine, “ultimate perfect character term,” T, for describing one’s character would go
something like this:
A set of states S and the term [T] would jointly hold only when one of a
79 Id. at 156.
80
 The point here is that whereas some genes guarantee that the overwhelming majority of individuals are
born with all and only the right parts in the right places, they have other functions as well.  “The function of many
genes is . . . to switch other genes on or off.  And the susceptibility of a gene to be switched on or off depends on the
sensitivity of its promoters,” that is, on a species of genetic material that facilitates the production of proteins when
other genetic materials (“transcription factors”) attach themselves.  Ridley, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra note #
–, 31.   What causes such genes to switch other genes on or off?  Put simply, the environment, defined broadly in
terms of the unique, non-genetic experiences each individual encounters.  An individual’s S (or motivational set)
includes at least one’s “desires, evaluations, attitudes, projects, and so on.”  Williams, Internal Reasons, supra note #
-- at 35.  Thus, describing the composition of a state is itself a complex task.  Cf. David C. Rowe and Kristen C.
Jacobsen, In the Mainstream: Research in Behavioral Genetics 23-4, in Ronald A. Carson and Mark A. Rothman,
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY (Johns Hopkins 1999) (describing state dependence
as part of a developmental model according to which “past behavior affects future behavior,” such that the
commission of a crime increases the likelihood of future criminality).  I discuss this in considerably more detail in
On the Potential of Neuroscience:  A Comment on Greene and Cohen’s For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, ----.
81 See Allan Gibbard, Genetic Plans, Genetic Differences, and Violence: Some Chief Possibilities, in 
Wasserman and Wachbroit, GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR ,supra note # –, at 177-78 (noting the theoretical
deficiencies of folk psychological explanations of causal relations).
82
 It is true that if the jurisprudence of excuses were taken to its logical conclusion, it reasonably could
produce an environment in which all intelligible rationales for misconduct would produce an excuse, and that this
environment is normatively unacceptable, at least without changing that jurisprudence.  See Michael S.  Moore,
Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1985) (“If one accepts the determinist thesis that all events,
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defining range of actions was performed, and given an action there would be
a set of combinations of S and [T] which account for it.79
Something close to T, a more accurate (if not perfect) character description, requires that
we describe these states with care, as the products of unique world experiences that emerge
from something more than the details revealed by a snapshot taken at t. A more fully
descriptive term or phrase would encompass a substantial record of the various states that
produced this unique person:  the events, conditions (including not least genetic
endowment, significant trauma and so on) and, as importantly, the opportunities to trigger
appropriate responsive “states.”  Acting together, these are the circumstances that generate
one’s “character,” and it is critical to note that the environment – each individual’s own
peculiar environment – triggers genetic change and neuronal growth and death in a process
of constant self-origination.80 
A more fully reported S, therefore, must include both analytically-appraised
intentional behaviors and their related neurobiological adaptive processes.81 An S that
incorporates the antecedent circumstances affecting character development over time –
personhood – would reveal a complicated, interconnected network of traits, but it is a
process over which we should seek maximum understanding because doing so will yield
policies and decisions that embrace genuine compassion and move toward greater safety
over time.82 The T that more fully describes an individual’s intentions no more complex
including all human behavior, are caused, and if one believes that causation excuses, then one must believe that
moral responsibility is an illusion on which liability to criminal punishment cannot be built.”).  So our jurisprudence
concerning punishment and incarceration needs to be debated once again.  “Punishment” and “incarceration” can be
achieved more humanely with noun substitutes, like “treatment,” where both normatively and descriptively
appropriate, in lieu of the current punishment default, and “incapacitation” when the risk of future dangerousness so
requires.
This would be a daunting task if the prosecution were required to bear the burden of proof on “treat-
ability,” and that failing to carry that burden produced a not “guilty” verdict.  “Treat-ability,”, for example, asks
whether the defendant is more likely to achieve a more law-abiding status as a person undergoing extensive
counseling and education than he is to emerge (if ever) as a hardened career criminal.  We should strive to measure
such tendencies with the best available medical and psychological standards and rules.  I address the neurobiological
basis of the measurement problem at length in Blaming Angry Men, supra,, mss in the author’s possession.
83
 Morton, supra note # –, at 156.  On the systemic biases we bring to the attribution of blame, see infra text
accompanying notes —.
84
 Morton, supra note # –, at 156.  One apparent exception to this point is the nascent defense of diminished
capacity.  See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (approving the admissibility of
evidence of reduced mental capacity for the purpose of showing that the defendant was incapable of forming the
requisite intent).  One wonders, however, why a separate doctrine is required to address what is primarily an
evidentiary issue.  See M. P. C. § 4.02, cmt. at 219. 
85
 Morton, supra note # –, at 156.
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than are the basic ideas of fairness and justice.  Again, what is remarkable (even mind-
boggling) about this debate is that no one seriously doubts the influences of such
antecedent events and conditions on the development of character as a matter of fact and
common intuition; it is only as a matter of our penal law and its expectations that we
disregard these insights.  Taking cognizance of these facts in our criminal justice system
demands a good deal of honesty than we now exhibit and much more good will than our
politics currently allow.
Instead of using more precise compound descriptions, which requires an expanded
narrative of life – a sensitive inquiry into the adaptations that the actor’s environment
required for survival – we substitute “fixed patterns of explanation in terms of beliefs,
desires, and other well-behaved states,” which move us in this direction but stop well short,
thereby encouraging us freely to fill in the epistemological chasms in light of patterns of
character attributions we have already assimilated.83 What we require, if we hope to find
and reinforce the wrongdoers’ redemptive features, is the ability “to capture in one’s
ascriptions of character the reasons why this particular person, at this time, is moved by
these motives.”84 Sadly, we don’t, in general, follow this course in our substantive law.  The
complexities always seem too great.  Instead, Morton points out, “we invent a labyrinth of
character terms interacting in their effects and stratified in complicated ways, to capture
more and more of the particularity of people.”85 
Within the highly cropped terms we use to describe character are patterns of notable
conduct that we attribute to the bad character of wrongdoers in light of our collective
86
 Amélie O. Rorty, Explaining Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note # –, at 103, 104.
87 Id. at 103 (seeking to explain the “unexpected conservation of emotions,” that is, why people fail to
change their emotional commitments when circumstances seem to warrant it).
88
 For a description of how such an evaluation might be made, see  Gibbard, supra note # –, at 188-92.
89 See, e.g., Donald Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS
22, 31-3 (concluding that Aristotle provided no fully satisfactory explanation for “incontinent actions.”).
90
 Some of the most creative work in this area has been done by Owen D. Jones.  See, e.g., Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. L. REV. 1141
(2001); On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality and the Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV.  2072 (2000);
Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N. C. L. REV. 1117, 1200-04
(1997).
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 Just as we use second order “avoidance” techniques to ascribe blame when doing so  appears to be
consistent with our world views, see, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the impulse to Blame, 68
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1003, 1004-05 (2003), we might need to rethink our default tests of competency and
modifications to the burden of proof to counteract these tendencies.
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aspirations, which may or may not be accurate in light of their relative capacities-in-fact.
In everyday matters, it seems “implausible and inaccurate to explain an inappropriate
attitude by attributing a belief or desire that would rationalize it, because the apparently
anomalous emotion is embedded in a system of . . .  inappropriate attitudes or false
beliefs.”86 To assess these inappropriate (and often criminal) systemic attitudes with
greater precision enjoins us to trace an individual’s causal history, and an apparent problem
with this is prescription is determining the biographical starting point.  For a full
explanation one has to go all the way back “to explain the prepropositional but intentional
habits of salience, organization, and interpretation.  It is these which, through later
intervening beliefs and attitude – many of them false and inappropriate – explain the
conservation of emotions,”87 that is, the persistence of evidently disadvantageous emotional
(and thus behavioral) states.88 The Greeks labeled some of these phenomena “akrasia;”89
we might call them “maladaptations.”90
C.  The problematics of blame attribution – Unfortunately, the problem that is the
everyday use of incomplete semantic descriptions of character in criminal law only begins
to state the deeper problems with blaming.  In order to factor in all the variables that would
produce a better external understanding of one’s character, we must first cross another
hurdle before we could accurately assess blameworthiness:  namely, overcoming our own
biases in the construction of blame attribution, a difficulty which, if overcome, could
produce a reconfiguration of the burden of proof on issues such as basic competency.91
Cognitive social psychologists use the phrase “Fundamental Attribution Error” (FAE) to
describe a well studied phenomenon that reflects the existence of common biases in our
attributions of wrongdoing:  There is a significant likelihood that in any instantiation of our
ordinary assessments of wrongdoing we over-attribute negative outcomes to character and
disposition rather than the situations in which actors find themselves.  In this subsection,
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 These phenomena are sometimes referred to as “internal attribution,” which examines the causative forces
internal to the actor that contribute to X doing M; and “external attribution,” which examines the causative forces
external to the actor that contribute to X doing M.  Taken to their extremes, the former assigns only internal
motivators to X doing M, and the latter assigns only external motivators to X doing M.  Attribution Theory (I):
Fundamentals, at www. psyc.abdn.ac.uuk/homedir/amilne/Social. 
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 Attribution Theory, http://hsc.uusf.edu/~kmbrown/Attribution_Theory-overview.htm.
94
 For a still useful summary of Heider’s early work in Gestalt theory, see Morton Deutsch and Robert M.
Krauss, THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 29-36 (Basic Book 1965).  According to Heider, “the attribution of
personal responsibility involves a decision as to which of several conditions of action – the intentions of the person,
personal power, or environmental factors – is to be given primary weight for the actual outcome.  In general, the
more the environmental factors are thought to influence the action, the less the person is held responsible for an
action with which he is connected.”  Id. at 32. 
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 Attribution Theory, supra note # – (attributing the phrase “alert perceiver” to disciples of Heider, E. E.
Jones and K. E. Davis).
96
 There are at least two aspects to“free will,” although neither is sufficient to explain free will.  The first is
freedom of action, the second is freedom of choice.  Freedom of action speaks to capacity:  An actor could lack free
will simply because he or she lacks a certain capacity to act freely.  For example, a person with profound cerebral
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I briefly explain Attribution Theory (AT) and describe the biases it produces, FAE.  In the
following subsection, I suggest how these biases operate pervasively to produce counter-
productive results in the domain of punishment. 
AT describes how individuals explain causation, the whys of human conduct that we
routinely question:  Why did this human act occur?  When an actor performs an unwelcome
event, M, the observer often wants to know whether Ming occurred because of something
within the actor – that is, was it “dispositional” – or whether it occurred because of
something within the actor’s environment – that is, was it “situational?”92 AT evaluates the
assessment procedure of ordinary individuals, jurors and judges, for example.  Fritz Heider,
the Gestalt psychologist who developed the theory, described his approach to AT as an
example of “naive psychology” because it addresses how the person-in-the-street explains
observed behavior.93 Heider maintained that individuals account for the conduct of others
based on their (the observer’s) own beliefs, whether those beliefs are valid or not.94 The
“alert perceiver” makes inferences about another person’s intentions and dispositions based
on his or her observations; the inferences drawn are deemed to be “correspondent when the
behavior and the disposition can be assigned similar labels.”95 For example, the observer
might conclude that because X did an act that she, the observer, views as mean-spirited (or
kind), X is viewed as a mean-spirited (or kind) person.  Observers seek correspondence.
But is the observer’s naive psychological assessment of character (even usually) correct? 
The answer is resounding and unsettling:  sometimes.  To begin with, attributing
misconduct to an individual’s disposition or character raises the familiar problem of free
will:  The observer assumes that the actor being blamed enjoyed freedom of choice – he
could have done otherwise.96 The more difficult the action observed, moreover, the more
palsy lacks the capacity to undertake certain freely chosen activities, like playing basketball or serving as a
stenographer.  Freedom of choice, in contrast, speaks to opportunity.  A person may have the evident capacity to
choose, but lack the opportunity at the relevant time.  See John Martin Fischer, Introduction: Responsibility and
Freedom, in John Martin Fischer, ed., MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 9, 10-15 (Cornell 1986).  
97 Cf. Em Griffin, A FIRST LOOK AT COMMUNICATION THEORY (McGraw-hill, 2d ed. 1994) available at
www.afirstlook.com/archive/attribut.cfm?source=archther.   
98 Id. (quoting Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Short-Comings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 184 (1977) (page cite omitted).
99 See, e.g., Focus on Attribution Theory, at
www.ua1vm.ua.edu/~droskos/Attribution%20theory/sld002.htm. 
100
 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 369 (1992) (describing
the “stain theory” of Joel Feinberg, Sua Culpa, in Feinberg (ed.) DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 187 (Princeton 1970)). 
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 It could be that we use blame to channel retributive urges that many people cannot control.  Nonetheless
we understand intuitively that at the soul of retribution is anger and the potentially vicious conduct it can generate. 
See Some Thoughts on the Aesthetics of Retribution, note – supra. 
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likely the observer is to attribute it to free choice.  For example, although it is probably not
easy to split someone’s skull in half with a hammer, an observer provided with little or no
information before deciding whether a severe head injury resulted from accidental or
intentional conduct is more likely to attribute the injury to an actor’s bad character (or
disposition) than to the situation.97 This over-estimation is a constant phenomenon, and
so there is a consistent “fundamental attribution error” running through the process:  We
tend to underestimate situational influences, and overestimate dispositional influences, on
behavior.98 Additionally, FAE is more prominent when we judge others than it is when we
judge ourselves.99
When we attribute blame and responsibility to an individual for M, which invariably
results from a number of substantial causative factors, we tend to “cite the cause for which
an actor is most blameworthy, that is, we search for the cause containing the most indelible
stain” on the actor’s character.100 It is certainly not clear why this tendency to point and
attribute fault to character has evolved and with what rewards and anguish, but it is an
omni-present feature of the blaming practice.101 Nor is it entirely clear what to do about this
tendency beyond recognition.  That something must be done, however, follows from the
obvious fact that this systemic tendency does not reflect our better, more compassionate
natures.
Professor Mark Alicke demonstrated this dispositional preference in an artfully
designed study that asked subjects to review one of several experimental narratives that
ended with the exact same bad outcome.  Alicke asked subjects (observers) to evaluate the
identical conduct of four individuals.  The motives of the individuals involved in the
narratives varied from favorable to benign to culpable; their motives, however, were
102
 For example, in one experimental setting, a driver (D1) exceeding the speed limit (40 mph in a 30 mph
zone) hit a car traveling in the opposite direction; the “other” driver (D2) suffered multiple cuts, a broken collar bone
and a fractured arm.  Observers were then told that the accident occurred in one of four contexts:  as D1 (a) was
rushing home to celebrate his anniversary; (b) was rushing home to hide a vial of cocaine he had left in the open at
his parent’s home; (c) tried to stop but hit an unanticipated oil spill on the road; or (d) tried to avoid D2 who had run
through a stop sign.  The study showed that causation was attributed to D1 as a function of his motive, and that D1
was more likely to be held responsible (and pay enhanced damages) depending on the negative circumstances in
which the accident occurred.  As Alicke noted, “in the socially undesirable motive condition [the desire to hide
cocaine], the focal actor [D1] was . . . cited more frequently as a cause than any other factor, even when [D2] was
clearly negligent in running through the stop sign.”  Alicke, Culpable Causation, supra, note # –, at 369-70.  For
similar findings see F. D. Fincham and T.R. Shultz, Attribution of Responsibility: From Man the Scientist to Man as
Lawyer, in 13 A DVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 81 (L. Berkowitz, ed., 1981).
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 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL.
556, 557 (2000) (describing Fincham and Shultz, Attribution of Responsibility: From Man the Scientist to Man as
Lawyer,  supra note # –) (hereafter, “Culpable Control).  Put otherwise, “a judgement of blameworthiness
presupposes a judgement of causation.”  Kathleen M. McGraw, Conditions for Assigning Blame: The Impact of
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 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 557 (summarizing B. Weiner, JUDGMENTS OF
RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT (NY: Guilford Press 1995)).
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relevant only to the occasion of the harm, and not to its material causation.  Despite the
absence of this causal relevancy, the subject-observers significantly attributed fault to the
actors whose motives for action were perceived as more blameworthy (less worthwhile)
than to those actors whose motives were neutral or favorable.  To reiterate, the observers
made the negative character attributions notwithstanding the fact that motivation was
causally unrelated to the unwelcome outcomes.102
There are several ways to explain these and similar findings, and none is necessarily
exclusive of any (or all) others for they can be synthesized based on existing research data.
Fincham and Schultz, for example, advance an “entailment model” to explain FAE.
According to their basic rationale, the tendency to blame (in general) occurs whenever
observers discover some causal link between the actor and the harm inflicted.  Importantly,
that causal linkage is sufficient to impose retributive punishment on these actors, because
the observer’s attribution of causal control establishes not only the necessary evidential link
between the actor and the harm inflicted; it also serves in the process of justifying
punishment.103
Weiner moves the explanation further along with his identification of a “stage
theory,” according to which our assessments of responsibility generally move in stages from
“an evaluation of personal and impersonal causation (based on an analysis of intent) and
considers the extent to which the actor controlled the harmful outcomes and [then to]
whether mitigating circumstances existed.”104 Weiner provides empirical support for a basic
105
 For a useful work that ties FAE to the doctrinal anomalies of felony murder, to the attempt/completed
crime asymmetry in punishment, and to its affect on different theories of punishment that defy the formal principle of
grading, see Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (2003).
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 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 557 (discussing the work of K. G. Shaver, THE
ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME; CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS (NY: SPRINGER-VERLAG 1985)).
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 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 557.
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assumption that is formally embedded (if not always actually honored105) in our law:  a
direct relationship between levels of criminal intent and desert.  According to a third theory,
described as a “sequential stage model,” observers typically move “into sequential stages
of causal attribution, responsibility attribution, and finally blame,” where blame is broken
down further into moral responsibility (knowing, voluntary action) modified (whenever
appropriate) by an excuse or justification.106
Alicke’s contribution to this line of research is an extension of sequential stage theory
called the “culpable control model.”   This work adds two dimensions to the earlier research.
First, it provides empirical support for the presence of a strong spontaneous affective
component in the process of attributing blame.  It also adds a “blame-validation”
component, where evidential and motivational biases are deployed to validate the prior
spontaneous ascriptions of blame.  “Because cognitive shortcomings and motivational
biases are endemic to blame,” Alicke writes, “a psychological treatment of this model
requires a model in which personal expectations and emotional reactions are central
components.”107 This affective/emotional component nourishes the three inter-related
elements of personal control assessment:  “mental states, behaviors, and consequences,”
where the mental element encompasses intentions, the behavioral elements include acts
and culpable omissions, and the consequences include both immediate and extended
attributions.108
Alicke’s model assumes that observers “deliberately and consciously” assess the links
between (1) choice and conduct, (2) the actor’s apparent impact and the harmful outcome,
and (3) his desire for and anticipation of the unwelcome consequences: all staples of
criminal law.  The novelty he contributes from the perspective of criminal law – and what
puts him in the camp with those who study FAE – is his demonstration that individual
observer judgments are influenced by “relatively unconscious, spontaneous evaluations”
in the assessment of each of the three elements.  “Spontaneous evaluations are affective
109 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 558; accord Bargh and Chartrand, supra note # –, at 465
(“The idea that social perception is a largely automated psychological phenomenon is now widely accepted.”).  See
generally Russell H. Fazio, David M. Sanbonmatsu, Martha C. Powell and Frank R. Kardes, On the Automatic
Activation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 (1986).
110 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 558.
111 Id.  On rational analysis, see Robert Nozick, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 74 (Princeton, 1993)( stating
that the “rational person will try to be aware of whether the reasons she has are a biased indicator of truth and will
accordingly shape her estimate of the truth from the reasons she has.  If she judges her reasons to be unrepresentative
in some particular direction, she will correct for this.”). 
112 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 558.  The phenomenon I’m elucidating here is an
instantiation of cognitive dissonance.  I have examined this well researched human reaction in a legal context in The
Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law and History, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 537 (1990).
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 The factors involved in assessing causal and volitional control vary as a function of the observer’s
perception of whether (and to what extent) the actor’s conduct is seen as willful and purposive as opposed to
accidental: the greater the perception of purposes, the greater the assessment of volitional control.  Issues of personal
control also vary as a function of assessments of  individual capacity and situational constraints, roughly
corresponding to cognitive capacity (diminished capacity, for example) and justifications and excuses.  Alicke,
Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 559-61.
114 Id.
30
[emotionally- induced] reactions to the harmful event and the people involved.”109 They are
driven by two sources:  the information the observer possesses about the actor’s “intentions,
behaviors, or the consequences they produce,” and “extra-evidential factors” such as the
actor’s reputation and social status.110
What is of central concern here is the finding that our attribution biases are nearly
universal and difficult to eradicate:  The construction of blame follows from the perception
of inappropriate motivation, even when motivation is literally irrelevant to the cause of
harm.  This tendency continues to plague us even when observers attempt to validate their
initial spontaneous attributions of blame, which occurs when the stress of observation is
lowered and the blame attributors (presumably) make their assessments more soberly; that
is to say, when the rational analysis model would predict better judgment, observers still
review the evidence of linkage from intention to behavior to consequences in the same
biased manner.111 Alicke’s work indicates that observers continually exaggerate the actor’s
volitional control over unwelcome outcomes either “by lowering their evidential standards
for blame or by seeking information to support their blame attribution bias.”112
This same phenomenon is reflected in our tendency to over-impute causal control
to human agency, namely, FAE.113 As a result of blame-validation processing, “observers
are inclined to blame the actor or actors who arouse the most negative affect or whose
behavior confirms unfavorable expectations.”114 The upshot is that “expectations and
115 Id.
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 Garth Williams, Blame and Responsibility, 6 ETHICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 427 (2003).  And, of
course, the crabbed, binary understanding of capacity-in-fact often disables fact-finders even from considering (at
least formally) the effects of substandard non-pathological cognitive and volitional deficiencies.
117 Id. at 432; McGraw, supra note # –, at 115.  Alicke also considers the effect of counterfactual reasoning
and attributions of control, noting that if the harmful outcome would have occurred independent of the actor’s causal
contribution, the perception of “effective causal control” is reduced but [as he shows] . . .  not eliminated.  Alicke,
Culpable Control, supra note # –, at 561.  This assessment appears to occur in two stages:  First, the observer
contemplates how the harmful outcome could have been avoided.  Next, he accords causal priority to causal events
that could have been avoided and uses that priority as a basis for attributing blame.  See Neal J. Roese,
Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. REV. 133 (1997).  
Whether we “come to” the use of these counterfactuals as a product of our inherent natures or borrow them
from without is, from a Humean perspective, probably not relevant.  See supra text accompany note – (declaring that
the “sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, toward this action. . . lies in yourself, not in the object.”).
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affective reactions [are] conflated with assessments of personal control.”115 Because of these
deep-seated, non-idiosyncratic reactions, we tend to alter our judgments of
blameworthiness, generally assessing more blame on the putative wrongdoer than the
context requires.  This tendency to construct blame as reactions to perceived agential
motivation and control is significant and significantly harmful.
D.  Why FAE matters: FAEC (FAE + Costs) – The price we pay for a practice of
judging that over-attributes wrongdoing to character, FAEC, is the subject of an important
recent article by Professor Garth Williams.  Williams notes that our current culture of
blaming generates three counterproductive features that undermine the potential benefits
our punishment regime might produce for our culture generally and wrongdoers
specifically.  Each of the three costs arises by virtue of the unwillingness of the blamer (or
observer, which includes all of us individually and collectively, and not least jurors and
judges) to confront the complexities that underlie our attributions of blame and
responsibility.116 
FAEC-1, the first negative effect attributable to over-emphasizing the individual’s
character, is a tendency to demonize the actor.  By failing to consider adequately the
situational factors in which wrongdoing occurs, we come to hold unwarranted beliefs about
the truth value of our assumptions about what an actor could have done other than Ming,
engaging in wrongdoing.117 The result of this inclination threatens to focus all of our
attention on the actor’s dispositions and intentions and, in so doing, yields a practice that
simply does not serve the long term normative goal of making our neighborhoods safer
places to live.  By focusing on the actor’s character, observers (Williams call them “finger-
pointers”) leave us with few opportunities to offer constructive help.  (This might explain
politicians’ disdain for reformative practices; the politician generally wants to present
118
 Even so-called “moderate” to “liberal” politicians embrace “get tough” policies when it comes to
discussions of punishment in election politics.  See, e.g., The Cost of the Incarceration Boom:  Correction
Expenditures Rise, While Programs and Oversight Are Cut, at http://home.comcast.net/~lwva/Harshba.htm (quoting
former Massachusetts’ Governor William Weld stating that “prison should be like a tour through the circles of hell”).
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120 See id. at 434-35.
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 The law of non-contradiction holds that believing p and not-p concurrently defines irrationality.  See
David Wiggins, Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 48 (ed. by Ted
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himself or herself as not just tough-on-crime but the opposite of “them.”118) The wrong-
doer is too often reduced to a label:  “just the kind of person who does M,” a designation
that transforms the actor in the observer’s consciousness into someone who regularly acts
inappropriately if not invariably criminally.119 After describing the culprit in such hopeless
terms, the alternatives left to the many finger-pointers among us concerning the actor’s
future are narrow and gravitate toward “manipulation,” which could be broadly or narrowly
conceived and is always prone to moving toward “outright coercion,” thus running the
gamut from a  slap on the wrist to death by gas or electrocution or lethal injection.120
Designating the wrongdoer as “just the kind of person who” shows the troubling
metaphysical problem discussed previously:  it threatens to render absurd our legal
culture’s nearly irrebuttable presumption of free will in many instances.  It is not strictly
a violation of the law of non-contradiction to use this off-putting characterological
description and simultaneously to avow that the wrongdoer commands free will, but it is
at least puzzling and troubling.121 Williams elaborates:
[I]t is somewhat odd to say that the culprit “just does that sort of thing”
(dispositional attribution) and also freely, that is, deliberately, chose to act
in that undesirable way.  These are only consistent, and this is not at all
coincidental, if we picture a more or less demonic agent, one who chooses
wrong for wrong’s sake. 122
Stated otherwise, the over-emphasis of dispositional blaming tends to transform
wrongdoers into creatures like Melville’s Claggert, the personification of pure evil:
The likes of Claggert, Melville wrote, are capable of
apprehending the good [they possess theoretical reasoning], but [are]
powerless to be it [they lack full-throated practical reasoning]; a nature like
[his] surcharged with energy as such natures almost invariably are, what
recourse is left to it but to recoil upon itself and like the scorpion for which
123 Herman Melville, BILLY BUDD 39 (Signet ed. 1998).  Rawls, following Sedgwick, lists the following
skills and attributes necessary to exercise full practical reasoning: 
(i)  To adapt the most effective means to our ends.
(ii) To acquire reasonable beliefs about our ends and objectives.
(iii) To select the more probable alternative.
(iv) To prefer the greater good (which helps to account for scheduling and adjusting       ends to be mutually
supporting.)
(v)  To order our objectives (by priorities) when they conflict.
Rawls’ LECTURES, supra note –, at 46.
124 Id. at 436-37.
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the Creator alone is responsible, act out to the end the part allotted to it.123
 
This view runs counter to a significant feature of our moral and theological values –
compassion. 
This distancing, which is constitutive of a fundamental attribution error, produces
FAEC-2, which Williams describes as “tunnel vision:”  a narrowing of the perspective we
bring to bear on our judgments about the actor.  Over-attributing unwelcome outcomes to
the actor’s character or disposition devolves into a refusal to take cognizance of the other’s
perspective, which (in turn) undermines the wrongdoer’s ability to receive honest
constructive criticism.124 What is important is that blaming usually reflects an emotionally-
laden reactive attitude that accents our negative view of the actor to the detriment of
situational considerations, and its narrowing tendency makes clear a point this essay began
with:  Blaming is a complex social process in which all of us, actors and observers alike, are
engaged and about which we must continuously ask questions.  As such, it requires that we
give to it its own commanding attention; we can’t focus only on what appears to lie behind
Mbecause the process generates contradictions that do not serve us well.  We cannot simply
“lock ‘em up and throw away the keys,” as our overlapping retributive inclinations would
often have us do.125
The affective/emotional aspect of FAE clarifies that rather than merely assessing and
responding to the many Ms wrongdoing produces, we as observers and finger-pointers
discharge our own emotions toward the actor; blaming reflects the internal mental states
that we project onto an external reality.  Another negative outcome of this practice is one
that Joel Feinberg has described:  We indelibly stain the wrongdoer by ratcheting up our
disapproval, which rarely produces a beneficial encounter between blamer and actor.126 At
the same time and possibly more damning still, we suffer the tendency of reducing
127
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assessments of the wrongdoer’s conduct to naive, over-simplified truth claims about his
character, which are reflected in our abbreviated semantics.  FAEC-2 thus permits us to
dismiss the wrongdoer’s perspective and (worse, I think) to search for an audience with
which we can share our self-certain truth about the wrongdoer.127 The actor whose conduct
we deplore – and whom we should hope to regenerate for the better – is now emotionally
and actually forsaken.128
FAEC-3 uncovers the final act in the blaming process:  the abandonment of an
individual based on his bad character.  This appears in part as the familiar practice of
scapegoating, which succeeds emotionally (if not rationally129) when we target a
wrongdoer’s character based on the simplified, biased, and other-directed stories of
wrongdoing we routinely tell ourselves.130 The most troubling aspect of this destructive and
unintended interpersonal process is that it provides us with license to deny our own
responsibility in the wider web of relationships of which we and our targets are a part.  The
other becomes an it – just the sort who – and we are excused as a part of our social
epistemology (what we take as a “usual, normal, and invisible” part of membership in our
community131), and so we deny the “co-responsibility and contingency” in our lives and
engage in a very troubling sort of moral accounting.  When we blame without accounting
as fully as we reasonably can for the “complex history of involvement in the events before,
during, and after the ‘blameworthy’ deed,” we lose sight of the good and loving use of
blaming.132 This denial of biographical narrative (of the need to determine who this person
is from a broader perspective) and the corresponding dismissal of co-responsibility becomes
suspicious, I think, in direct proportion to the self-righteous certainty one brings to
133 See id.
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process.133
Blaming as a social practice is deeply and too often tragically flawed; it fails to
acknowledge an inalienable truth:  that unaccountable contingencies mediate all inputs and
outcomes in significant ways.  As a result, compassion fails; we tend to assess the wrong
committed based on the need to determine guilt in a simplified, biased moral accounting
according to which every unwelcome outcome is equated with or projected onto an
appropriately “guilty” individual.  (This may account in part for the reluctance of many
theorists to acknowledge the existence of moral luck.134 It demands a willingness to invest
substantial personal energy against deeply-ingrained retributive urges.)  When we engage
in the process of conjecturing the wrongdoer’s intentions in a moral audit to which we bring
our own biases, we empower ourselves to disregard the fact that we bear some
responsibility for the conditions that undermine for many the possibility of developing
normatively appropriate practical reasoning skills.135 When we disregard our own
responsibility for the creation or continuation of the kinds of antecedent conditions and
events that produce inappropriate conduct, we heap blame on the individual alone.  But
determinations of guilt are not simple matters of matching intentions with misconduct on
a scale of comparative adversity,136 something like Thompson’s connecting thesis, CT. It
may be that this simplistic accounting of moral matching works at one level of attribution
and of retribution – finding a causal agent and discharging the feeling of release among
others137 – but it fails to chronicle faithfully the myriad contingencies that “inhere between
will and deed, between character and situation, between choice and result.”138 We often opt
for a form of reductive condemnation:  We foist all such unwelcome contingencies on the
individual, label him bad, and hope to be done with him.   
In light FAEC, it is at least appropriate and fair to express some wonder about who
the audience is for such unforgiving attributions of blame, why we choose this or that
audience, and what we hope to accomplish on their behalf and ours when we engage in a
139 Cf. Watson, Responsibility, supra note –, at 276-77 (ultimately rejecting the metaphor of reliance on a
throw of the dice but understanding the sensation).
140 Cf. Hume, TREATISE, supra note # –, at 489 (declaring that one “cannot [do] better” than to “consult”
rational interests, where “better does not entail the best conceivable”).  See generally Rawls, LECTURES, supra note #
–, at 60.  Rawls affirms that Hume’s understanding of “conventions” (including those that move us toward the better)
included striving for the “practically best scheme.”  Writes Rawls:  “[Hume] doesn’t mean that it is the best scheme
we can imagine, much less the best scheme allowing that human beings and our situation in nature might have been
different.  He means that it is the practically best scheme, accepting ourselves and our situation in nature as it is,
without weeping or lament.”
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process that so distances us (the good guys) and them (the bad ones) in a Whig culture
formally committed to the idea of human improvement.  It’s as if we have forgotten that
among the systemic issues this approach embodies is the failure to acknowledge a simple
fact:  If God had thrown the dice just one more time, the culprit being blamed might have
been you or me.139 Over such matters we have only good or bad fortune, and more or less
of it.  We certainly know that the world today is not always a just place, and we know that
current notions of objectivity often are nothing more than yesterday’s enlightened
standards and tomorrow’s ancien regime. We cannot claim widespread intersubjective
normative agreement sufficient to inflict pain on all those wrongdoers who fail to meet our
prescriptive standards if we neglect to reconsider the actual facts on the ground that inform
normativity and, in the process, honor our obligation to situate all the players in a
contingent world as best we can.140 Blaming –  and especially the process that transports
our biases into legal practice – discounts the need for active participation by everyone in
addressing the conditions that conduce to unwelcome conduct, and assumes a justness that
simply does not exist in fact.141 And facts are the lawyers’ domain.
IV.  Facing the Paradox of Evil
Accounting for the destructive features of blaming will advance our pursuit of a more
accurate determination of desert; the process requires more care in combining situational
and dispositional factors without bias; and that’s a daunting task.  As Amélie Rorty
suggests, the task often insists that we go “all the way back.”142 This retrieval process is not
simply a matter of deciding whether an unsavory actor caused (even in a substantial way)
an unwelcome event with sufficient cognitive capacity to attribute to him “knowledge” of
its wrongfulness; or of finding the putatively applicable statutory mens rea mirrored in our
reconstructed vision of the wrongdoer’s brain at or attributably near t;143 or, conversely, of
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determining whether some hyperpathology demands an excuse.144 Rather, we also must
commit to determining as best we can how he got to be that way; for without an answer to
the how question, we have no hope of preventing the rush of what seems to be an unending
supply of wrongdoers.  This approach implicates a far richer view of both the potential and
reality of human nature than settled jurisprudential doctrine recognizes, and it imposes
attendant costs.145 The practical difficulty with this suggestion is that it also produces an
unsettling problem,  accurately described as a paradox:  
The more egregious one’s misconduct, the more likely he is to be damaged;
the more likely he is to be damaged, the more likely he is to take advantage
of an excuse; and the more likely he is to take advantage of an excuse,us the
more likely he is to avoid suffering the full penalties the law prescribes,
which are themselves based on our collected folk wisdom. 
To the extent, therefore, that excuses are viewed as beneficial, because they permit the
wrongdoer to escape some quantum of punishment, increasing their availability might
produce perverse incentives to engage in the conduct that generates them.146
This result would surely present a serious problem if addounting for wrongdoing
accurately wasn’t consistent with our theological and moral commitment to compassion,
and if the only alternative to the default recipe of imprisonment was permitting dangerous
actors to roam the streets.  But retributive imprisonment isn’t the only alternative; civil
commitment, or some more humane variant thereof, is an alternative to imprisonment.147
Civil commitment is an alternative and it, too, depends on the good will of the entire
system, from top to bottom.148 But there’s a deeper problem as well, and it concerns our
individuals] mechanisms of legal punishment to be used at their discretion.
Michael Foucault, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 21 (Trans. by Alan Sheridan; New York:
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razor-thin understanding of the propriety of  blame; this understanding, too, ought to evoke
some emotional tension.
Using the biographical highlights of the psychopath, Robert Alton Harris, as his test
case, Gary Watson describes the source of a basic, intuition-based, moral conflict:  “To be
homicidally hateful and callous in Harris’s way [to eat the lunch of the innocent teens he
has just brutally and senselessly killed] is to lack moral concern to an extent that comes as
close to entirely as one can, and to so lack moral concern is to be incapacitated for moral
community.”149 This explanation, which is clearly consistent with one fork in the stream
that our moral intuition follows, potentially exempts every hateful and callous criminal
from moral disapprobation; and these exemptions might seem to arise more or less
independently of any particular wrongdoer’s unique background.  But in the case of Harris
we know he had a hideous, loveless and brutalizing background.150 In the case of Andrea
Yates, we know she had suffered severe depressive conditions that erupted more than once
into full blown psychotic episodes following childbirth.  The conduct of Dahmer can be
explained only as the manifestation of a catastrophic genetic defect:  The taste for human
flesh is well beyond any description of individual intentions one can fathom.  Logically, he
could not have caused his own desire to cannibalize his unsuspecting victims; only grave
neurobiological imperfections and environmental catalysts can explain this desire.151 Some
form of incapacitation, therefore, is at least appropriate in some cases beyond any doubt
152
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question.  If necessary, so is indefinite isolation.152 
The facts bearing on lack of capacity-in-fact and environmental opportunities
represent a fundamental conundrum for the metaphysics that undergird our jurisprudence
of punishment.  For example, compatibilists, by definition, justify punishment within a
determinist world.153 For utilitarian compatibilists, what matters is that holding people
responsible for their actions has efficacy in regulating behavior.154 For others generally
within this school, what matters is that blaming expresses and confirms community
resentment.155 In both cases the sought after penal goal is achieved whether or not the
conditions of epistemologically-informed, full moral assessment are met.  To the question,
“Here we are today; what should we do from here?” different answers thus appears.  For the
regulator or expressivist, the answer is, “How he got to the point of blameworthy
misconduct makes no difference.”156 And for incompatibilists or hard determinists,157 in
contrast, Harris’s biography may prove their case:  His background, if only in retrospect,158
seemed to doom him; for if we view him as the mechanistic product of an egregious
childhood, we cannot hold him responsible.  (This does not mean that it is clear that Harris
had to turn out as he did; his siblings did not become vile, hateful killers.)  Given the level
of abuse he suffered and what we know about the potential effects of abuse, and given Yates’
history of postpartum psychotic depressive episodes, our intelligible reactions to such cases
159 See Watson, supra note # –, at 275.
160 Id.
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ought to be and often is, “No wonder they turned out that way.”159 There is no non-
compassionate way to avoid these reactions.
Our ability to appreciate their emotionally and physically challenged backgrounds
should cause us to react with appropriate moral uncertainty.  We see their capacities for
brutality and respond to them as the killers they are:  They have inflicted unimaginable pain
and suffering on wholly undeserving victims.  But we also should see them as tragic figures
caught within the web of uncontrollable antecedent events and conditions that trapped
them within brutal lives, and so we sense that they too are victims.  How many children
suffer such a total absence of love and cruelty as did Harris and survives “normal”?  Of
Harris’s crimes, Watson writes,“Our sympathy toward the boy he was is at odds with the
outrage toward the man he is.”160 We still have good cause to fear him, therefore, and to
fear his kind of violence, at least absent substantial successful treatment and, when
necessary, a long period of confinement (and even indefinite incapacitation, provided
adequate process).161 But we should also be conflicted.  Harris’s formative years were
inflicted on him without any choice and yet he “unambivalently endorse[d] suffering, death,
and destruction, and that is what (one form of) evil is.”162 Following the birth of her
firstborn, Yates suffered from a debilitating depressive episode through no fault of her own,
and yet she viciously killed all her children.  That we can understand these actions as
predictable responses to horrifying conditions suggests both the fragility of our moral
judgments and the need for compassion.
V.  On Coping With Our Irregular Sentiments
This work began by noting that the urge to blame is an aboriginal emotional
sentiment.  In his classic treatise, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, Adam Smith
observed that our judgments about blameworthiness (and praiseworthiness) hinge on three
elements:  (a) the intent with which an action is done, (b) the action that the intention
produces, and (c) the good or bad consequences that follow from the action.163 He argued
that elements (b) and (c) – acts and consequences –  were logically unrelated to our
164 Id.  The irony that we require both (at least formally) as epistemological requisites to a procedurally
sound conviction is beyond the scope of this article.  See Aesthetics of Retribution, supra note # – (co0ncluding that
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assessments of blame.164 Smith was presaging later “subjectivist” theorists who contend
that harm should not be relevant to assessing blame:165 the consequences, Smith opined,
are “indifferent either to praise or blame.”  He concludes that (a) – the “intention or
affection of the heart” – is all that matters; and asserts strongly that this “maxim . . .
[reflects] self evident justice.”166
Smith was a utilitarian.167 He might have disparaged the retributive urge centuries
ago as unnecessary idealism.  Instead, he explained the strikingness of harmful
consequences and our tendency to respond thereto with blame:
What chiefly outrages us against the man who injures or insults us is the little
account which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he
gives to himself above us, and the absurd self-love, by which he seems to
imagine that other people may be sacrificed at any time to his convenience or
his humor.168
Many of us experience something like this as an instance of “road rage,” the (sometimes
nearly uncontrollable) anger that often ensues after someone cuts off or otherwise
endangers another driver in traffic.169 My normal (nearly-enraged but printable) reaction
is likely to be:  “How dare you fr#%*g jackass imagine that I might be sacrificed at any time
for your fr#%*g convenience?”  Smith’s analysis is right, of course.  To deny this truth is to
dismiss Hume wholesale.170 
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But this tendency to transform harm committed into an over-ascription of blame
that reflects the wrongdoer’s evil character is not only unfair.171 We should know that it is
also counterproductive to the goal of an increasingly more sensible system of criminal
justice because the extant view makes little room for meaningful efforts at rehabilitation.
At least for me, it raises the never well answered old question that began this work:  “How
can we charge the reformatory view of punishment with disrespecting human personality,
simply because it acknowledges humankind’s animal inceptions (or our imperfect
psychological natures) and hopes t use such information as a means to the good of his our
higher selves, remains incomprehensible.  I say this understanding (as best I can) that no
sane, fully flourishing person would advocate for a system that permits dangerous actors
to roam the streets and threaten our families, our children and ourselves.  My means and
end are pragmatic and compassionate; the two cannot naturally (or factually) be
oppositional.  A humane practice of commitment, which avoids the regime of punishment,
could provide an alternative,172 because we need a regime that suspends blame, at least as
a reflexive default social reaction.
The system I envision turns the normal process, which (if it addresses these queries
at all) generally saves for the sentencing phase questions about (non-pathological) capacity-
in-fact and opportunity so that certain decisions will be made on the front end of the
process rather than the back-end.  It retains a role for blame, but it does so only as part of
a procedure that initially asks two questions and then operates on the two axes.  The X axis
measures capacity-in-fact: as best we can tell, does this individual have capacity for learning
basic moral lessens?  The Y axis examines past opportunities for moral education and the
uses made in light of those opportunities:173 What was possible where and when this person
174 See note – supra.
175 See, e.g.,United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that brief period of
incarceration for wealthy, well-educated older man who plead guilty to multiple state and federal counts of criminal
deliberate non-impulsive fraud “are among the most likely to be generally deterrable”) (citations omitted).
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matured, and what opportunities to advance were actually present?  On the X axis, the state
questions cognition and volitional control:  we test to determine whether the wrongdoer has
or does not (lacks) cognitive skills, and whether he can or cannot control his conduct within
extant standards of control.  If he fails on either dimension, he lacks adequate capacity-in-
fact.  On the Y axis, we examine as best we can, socioeconomic and educational
opportunities.  We ask, first, whether the actor has or has not have such opportunities, and
if he, second, whether has had sufficient opportunity, whether he did or did not make some
minimally sufficient use of them in the past.  Under this proposal, meeting the current
demands of minimal instrumental rationality174 simply indicates that the actor should
remain in the criminal justice system.  For those unable even to effectuate a simple practical
syllogism, cognitive competency remains an issue; that is to say, psychiatric treatment and
incapacitation may still be required.  And if has little or no volitional control (the
psychopath being the model for such incapacity) he is relegated to a system that implements
minimally coercive procedures to effectuate necessary constraint.
After this assessment is made, then a modified blaming and punishment practice
takes over insofar as they remain practicable.  Those who have ample cognitive capacity,
affective control, and good fortune but fail to make use of them are, prima facie, the most
culpable both morally and intuitively for they (when compared to those who are cognitively,
emotionally, or experientially deprived) more likely should have done otherwise. (I also
suspect their crimes are typically the more intelligible and deterrable as well.175) In
contrast, those who lack both capacities and suffer bad antecedent luck are the least
blameworthy for, prima facie, they likely could not have done otherwise. In the middle are
those who possess sufficient cognitive skill and capacity-in-fact but lack the opportunity to
adapt appropriately or lack the capacities but have been blessed with good opportunities;
all may well require restraint, but little or no blame, and certainly not vengeful, retributive
treatment.  For all such groups, moral education during their period of incapacity is the only
meaningful moral alternative if protecting future generations is our goal.
V.  Conclusion
I have tried to link our concepts of blame to the psychological phenomena that
support it.  I have examined the moral philosophy of blaming, which often produces the
conclusion that the actor who causes harm is bad. In large part, that conclusion both
inspires and rests on an abbreviated semantic description of character, which in turn both
animates and supports the social and cultural biases we bring to the practice of attributing
blame.  We thus tend to overlook or devalue the striking nature of the conditions within
which many wrongdoers reach maturity.  This endemic tendency to over-attribute
wrongdoing to the actor’s bad character is at best unfortunate for it casts the wrongdoer as
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the target of our scorn, undermines efforts to make society safer by educating the actor, and
removes us from responsibility for the social conditions that conduced to wrongdoing
initially.  At worst, it creates a subculture of Claggerts.
In lieu of blaming as a routine practice applicable to all instances of wrongdoing, I
suggest a new regime that suspends blaming, prima facie, pending an analysis of capacity-
in-fact and opportunity.  For those who lack capacity-in-fact and opportunity, the emphasis
should be on education, although incapacitating the dangerous still may be warranted.  For
those who have ample capacity and opportunity, blame is appropriate for we have good
reason to believe that they could have made choices other than those they made.  In the end,
the system I have outlined rests on compassion; the unwillingness to do to others what we
would not want done to us, had God rolled the dice differently.
